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THE TRANS-ATLANTIC FAMILY –
COUNSELING, MEDIATION, OR DIVORCE
Arthur and Frank Payne Distinguished Lecture

CHRISTOPHER PATTEN

Rt. Honorable Lord Patten of Barnes
and Chancellor of Oxford University

CHIP BLACKER: Good afternoon. My name is Chip Blacker and I'm the Director of the Stanford Institute for International Studies, and it's my pleasure to welcome you here today on behalf of the Institute, and to celebrate your attendance at the Spring Quarter Payne Lecture. The Payne Distinguished Lectureship is named for Frank and Arthur Payne, brothers who gained an appreciation for global problems through their international business operations. In establishing the lectureship, they hoped to raise public understanding of the complex policy issues facing the global community today, and to increase support for informed international cooperation. The lectureship has enabled the Institute to host such outstanding public and international citizens as Joseph Joffe, editor and publisher of the German weekly, *Die Zeit*, U.S. Senator Bill Bradley, former Mexican Foreign Minister Jorge Casteñada, U.S. Ambassador both to Poland and to Pakistan Tom Simons, and most recently Peter Eigen, founder and director of Transparency International. We are, needless to say, immensely grateful to those who have made this lecture series possible.

It is now my pleasure and good fortune to ask Professor David Holloway to come to the podium. Professor Holloway is the Raymond A. Spruance Professor of International History at Stanford. He is also a professor of Political Science, Senior Fellow at the Institute and in fact its former director, and David will introduce today's Payne Lecturer.

PROFESSOR DAVID HOLLOWAY: Thank you very much, Chip. That began to sound to me as though I had nearly as many titles as our speaker today, but actually the number falls far short. You will see from the program that's been handed out that today's speaker, the Right Honorable Christopher Patten, Lord Patten of Barnes, has had a very distinguished and a very rich career in public service. After Balliol, he joined the

Conservative Research Department, which has been the incubator for many leading Conservative politicians in Britain, and then he entered Parliament as a Conservative M.P., serving in the cabinets of Margaret Thatcher and John Major, and becoming in fact the Chairman of the Conservative Party, and in that capacity played a great role in the Conservative victory in 1992 but with one blemish—he lost his own seat. But that opened new horizons because he was then appointed Governor of Hong Kong, the twenty-eighth Governor of Hong Kong, and the last Governor of Hong Kong, whose responsibility it was to oversee the handover of Hong Kong to the People's Republic of China in 1997.

When he returned to Europe, or returned to Britain after that, he performed an extremely important function in chairing the independent Commission on Cleasing, which laid the basis for police reform in Northern Ireland. You could imagine he had a difficult task in China but the issue of policing in Northern Ireland was an extremely controversial one and one which that commission handled I think in a very effective way. In 1999 he was appointed one of the two British European commissioners and had responsibility for external affairs in the Prodi Commission, resigning from that position when the Prodi Commission ended its term at the end of last year, and he was then appointed a Life Peer and took a seat in the House of Lords.

Now this is a very multifaceted—that's a very brief—as you can see, indeed, from the program handed out—that's a very brief account of a very multifaceted career, and yet in all of that, I think it's true to say that Christopher Patten has consistently displayed a set of virtues, in particular the qualities of thoughtfulness and spiritedness in his speaking out, in his utterances on public matters and on political issues. He has always been eloquent and always very robust in what he says, and these qualities seem to be excellent qualities when addressing the title of this lecture, "The Transatlantic Family: Canceling, Mediation, or Divorce?" We welcome you, very glad to see you here. (Applause.)

CHRISTOPHER PATTEN: Thank you very much, indeed, Professor, for that very kind introduction, and thank you as well for inviting me to conduct this lecture. It's given me a brief escape from the House of Lords, which some of you will know is the "sealed train" of the British Constitution. (Laughter.) - and also a few days off from Oxford, where I'm the Chancellor of the University. My predecessor but one, Harold Macmillan, when asked what the Chancellor of Oxford did, said, "Well, as you know, the Vice Chancellor actually runs the University, but if you didn't have a chancellor you couldn't have a vice chancellor." (Laughter.) Anyway, thank you very much indeed for inviting me this evening.

The last time I was on this campus was to speak to the Board of Overseers of the Hoover Institute, and as luck would have it, that evening there was a great dinner on campus, and we were all privileged to hear a lecture by the English polemicist Paul Johnson. Mr. Johnson, like many neoconservatives, has traveled from the far conspiratorial left to the far conspiratorial right without any noticeable intervening wishy-washy moderate puzzled in the middle sort of stage. (Laughter.) And I think it's an interesting reflection—I just say this as an aside—how many right-wing ideologues have made that journey. In any event, that evening Mr. Johnson, who was on excellent form, laid out

Satan's temptations for the United States. He proposed that you should embrace without apology or shame the role of the world's imperial power. The world needed a new empire, he argued, and a new emperor. History's finger pointed at Washington, but never fear, Mr. Johnson offered Britain, an ancient colonial power whom you rightly helped to strip of her empire as your number-one spear-carrier and feudatory. Ever available to explain your interests and intentions to Europe's and the world's Nervous Nellies and Doubting Thomases.

I realized that Mr. Johnson's temptations fall on mostly deaf ears, but the hopes of a few seem to provoke outside these shores the fears of the many to adopt another metaphor, the provocative title of this lecture: Is the Transatlantic marriage admittedly not as originally intended, a marriage of equals, likely to break up because one partner wants always to get its own way, and the other nervous of these muscular designs is incapable itself of moving beyond rhetoric to the sort of action that would help to sustain the relationship?

Let me begin with the imperial theme. The Johnson invitation has been made more poetically before. Rudyard Kipling's racistly entitled "Take Up the White Man's Burden," was specifically directed towards America, urging you to take on the imperial mantle in the Philippines. President Roosevelt, while he disliked the poem, had some sympathy with the sentiment, but the imperial idea never really caught on in the United States. The America at the beginning of the last century was the world's greatest industrial power, and by the end of the century was also the greatest military, financial, commercial, technological and cultural power in the world. You bucked what some historians going back to the Eusidedes (?) believed to be almost a dictate of natural law, and refused to translate power into territorial aggrandizement and conquest. There is no real American settlement abroad. Most of those Americans who live overseas inhabit rich countries, not poor ones. Your universities do not, unlike Milner's Oxford, train an imperial cast of administrators. You don't seize territory though you're concerned about military bases and energy sources. You've only been drawn reluctantly into the political and security role consonant with your power in other areas.

America joined the First World War late, and declined to support, as you know, Woodrow Wilson's ambitions in the wake of that war to reshape the world with self-determination and international rules at the heart of a new cooperative system. Neville Chamberlain was not alone in lamenting in the 1930s that all one ever got from Americans was words. But you were drawn into Europe's second civil war, above all because of Japan's attack on your own territory, and at that war's end, the Wilsonian that had previously been rejected was seized on and implemented by a very great president, the draper from Missouri, and by an astonishingly capable and visionary group of public officials led by George C. Marshall and Dean Acheson.

There were I think three characteristics of the strategy which you pursued. First, you established institutions of global governance, most noticeably the United Nations, which helped to protect America's power from the fear and dread of the rest of the world. I believe that you regularly underestimate how important it is for a superpower to have its authority legitimized and channeled.

Secondly, you were determined that Europe should not return to xenophobic nationalism. You persuaded Europe to turn its back on the nineteenth century. The custom review is that NATO was the result of an American decision to leave a military footprint in Europe, and that the Common Market was the product of European economic ambition. The best history of modern Europe characteristically is written by a young American historian, William Hitchcock. He points out how far from the truth is the conventional view that I've just described. The American policy was directed to promoting economic and political integration in Europe in order that the military presence it was prepared to leave behind to deter the expansion of the Soviet empire, was not drawn into another bloody European civil war. American policy, clearly expressed by Truman, by Eisenhower and by Kennedy, was to help build in Europe an equal partner for the United States in order to share world leadership, political and economic.

Your third goal was to use American economic power and generous assistance to promote market-based prosperity elsewhere. George Marshall believed, as he said in his famous Harvard commencement address, that it was difficult to preach to people about democracy when they had empty stomachs.

It's difficult to think of any great power pursuing a more successful strategy since Augustus' Rome. The strategy rolled back the menace of Soviet imperialism, saved Western Europe and helped it to build prosperity and democratic societies, liberated eventually Central and Eastern Europe, and has helped to make Europe, to borrow a famous phrase, "whole and free."

Of course there were problems, problems, for example, in Vietnam where America and others discovered in the jungles and paddy fields of Southeast Asia that technology and wealth could not defeat an idea. It's interesting to recall the story of the waiter in the Ritz Hotel in Paris sending a message to President Wilson during the Versailles Conference urging him to support self-determination. The waiter was called Ho Chi Minh, and it took two successful wars against great powers for him to secure what he politely asked for from the sou-chef status that he enjoyed in post-war Paris.

There was also I think in the '50s, '60s, '70s and beyond, a tendency to see the world too much in Maniquian (?) terms. Anyone who was deemed to be on "our side," geopolitically, was thought to be good, however bad or corrupt they were. It's worth recalling that that's how Saddam Hussein was treated in the 1980s. There were some areas disfigured by war, disfigured by poverty, that was true of too much of Africa, and in the 1990s it was true of the Balkans as well. But by and large, most of the world after the American post-war settlement enjoyed over 50 years of stability and an explosion of prosperity. By the century's end, an American president was able to boast that most of the world lived in democracies, that there had been in 50 years a six fold increase in world output and a twenty-fold increase in trade in goods.

That was the world in which I grew up, a world where there was stability, peace and growing prosperity year by year, but there wasn't much gratitude for the superpower. One of the sillier arguments that one hears is that recent European critiques of America represent some novel historic shift. Forget it. From the earliest period of American

generosity and commitment to multilateralism in the 1940s, there were critics. It brings to mind the wonderful passage in Confucius' *Analek* (?) when the master says to one of his followers, "Why are you so angry with me? I haven't done you any favors." So you shouldn't think that anti-Americanism was invented yesterday. Read Simone de Beauvoir as early as 1946. Look at Graham Greene's *Quiet American*, admittedly a prescient novel about Vietnam but full of very strong statements of hostility to the United States. From the beginning, many Europeans showed ingratitude and demonstrated a particular European and condescension masquerading as sophistication. To borrow from the lyrics of the philosopher Randy Newman, "Were we grateful, no we were spiteful and we were hateful."

America's three greatest and most important allies apart from Japan have been France, Britain and Germany. How did they behave? From the outset, the French couldn't decide whether they were more worried because of the amount of help that the Americans provided, or that they were more worried because the help wasn't greater. It's an attitude described by the historian of modern France, Robert Gildy (?) as one of petulant ingratitude. There were riots when the first American general arrived in France to command NATO. There was a huge court case in the late 1940s about the availability of Coca Cola in France. Then there was the drama of the French expulsion of NATO from France and the French withdrawal from NATO's military command. President Chirac has a pedigree.

As for Great Britain, we discovered with a rude shock in 1956 that the United States was not prepared to underwrite our efforts to continue to play the role of a global power. There was the terrible humiliation of Suez. Suez, as you may remember, was an example of the invasion of an Arab country by European countries, which was stopped by the United States acting through the United Nations. As the French would say, "Autre temps, autre mer."

Harold Macmillan, who had worked with General Eisenhower during the Second World War, said at the outset of the invasion to his colleagues, "I know Ike, he'll lie doggo." Well, he didn't, and the United Kingdom had to withdraw with its tail between its legs.

As for Germany, well, when President Reagan went to address the Bundestag in the wake of the decision to deploy medium-range Cruise and Pershing missiles in Germany, there were four hundred thousand protesters on the streets. So Europe hasn't always been a comfortable, helpful, accommodating ally. We can't therefore argue that until the arrival of President Bush all was sweetness and light in transatlantic relations. Even during the Clinton presidency, there were some rows. There were disagreements about Kosovo, there were disagreements about the convention to outlaw landmines. I don't think we were ever convinced that whatever the president said rather late in the day he would actually have been able to get the Kyoto Protocol or the agreement on the international criminal court through Congress. But it was certainly a pretty storm-free relationship.

After the arrival of the new administration in 2001, we discovered a number of issues where there seemed to be a gap opening up between the European and the American positions. First there was the Middle East. President Clinton had made a huge effort at

Camp David and at Taba (?) to secure a settlement. The new administration seemed to take the line that despite his level of commitment, Clinton had failed, that he had suffered a humiliating rebuff, that this had been caused by Chairman Arafat, and that there was no point in a new administration showing the same level of engagement, especially with Arafat still there. So nothing much happened for four years. The politics drifted and the violence mounted.

Second, Secretary Powell seemed to indicate initially that American policy of support for the Korean reconciliation policy of Kim Da Jong (?) would be continued by the new administration. The policy had of course been started by Secretary Perry and Mr. Clinton. Then Kim Da Jong went to Washington and was given the cold shoulder. One result was that he appealed to Europe for support for his policy, and as a result I went to Pyong Yang with Jan Persson, the Swedish premier, and my colleague Javier Salono (?) for the most surreal three days of my life. It was both surreal and from Europe's position a rather salutary experience. We went pursuing a European initiative. All that Kim Jong Il, the small and extraordinary North Korean dictator wanted to walk about was America. We spent six and a half, seven hours with the dear leader pressing us again and again to explain to him why American policy had changed. It was of course difficult to get over to him the concept of an election. (Laughter.)

Thirdly, there was the abrogation of the ABM Treaty in order to facilitate the development of the Star Wars defensive shield. You remember the Star Wars defensive shield? This didn't seem to many outsiders to be directed against the most obvious threats faced by the United States, and so alas, it proved. When we expressed our worries to the administration we were told that it was nothing to do with us. It was an issue for the United States and for Russia, and that it certainly wasn't for Europeans to lecture America on what threats it faces and how those threats could best be countered.

But the fourth issue that perhaps had the biggest impact on European public opinion was the pretty brutal verbal and diplomatic assault on the Kyoto Protocol. We weren't fools. As I said earlier, we understood the political realities in Congress, but Washington's denunciation of the Protocol sounded a bit like the Pope telling Galileo that the sun orbited the earth. The message seemed to be a pretty blunt injunction to the world to go take a jump.

The Iraq controversy, which came after these disagreements, appeared to many to confirm a new American unilateralism. Nine-eleven had produced an outpouring of sympathy for America, which had of course discovered that to be invincible is not to be invulnerable. We fully supported the invasion of Afghanistan, though some of us worried that the job was only half done, clearly because of concerns not to tie down efforts that might be needed elsewhere. But it was the run-up to the Iraq war and the aftermath of that war which really turned European opinion against Washington, at the very least the occupation of Iraq did not seem to have been—how can I put it?—very well planned or very well managed.

I don't want to traverse familiar ground. We all have our opinions and prejudices about Iraq, and whatever the past arguments, it's in all our interests that Iraq should grow into a

successful, prosperous democracy, but I think there are three points, which should be noted. First, President Bush clearly won the American election as a war president. In Britain, his staunchest ally, Mr. Blair, has just called an election, which he may well win, but if he does it will not be because of the war but despite the war. Mr. Blair is still dogged by controversy surrounding the war. He came into office with as his principal aim the goal of making the United Kingdom comfortable with a leading role in Europe. Many think that the verdict of history could well be that he sacrificed that ambition in order to secure President Bush's agenda in Iraq.

Second, is the doctrine of preemption, which was described by the famous military historian of war, Sir Michael Howard, as the overturning of the entire history of international law. The doctrine of preemption is regarded with considerable doubt by many Europeans. The notion of preventive war raises even more opposition. My own view is that there will certainly be times, alas, in the future, when we will need to preempt threats by taking military action. My fear is that Iraq, not least because of the way the case for the invasion was made, will make it far more difficult to secure public support for any course of action, which involves asking the public to trust governments in general and the intelligence community, in particular.

Thirdly, war in Iraq without peace in the Middle East has not, to put it mildly, eased the tensions between the West and the Islamic world. When we're talking about the Western Arabic part of the Islamic world, remembering that three-quarters of the Islamic world is in Asia, we're talking about Europe's neighborhood. This will be even truer if Turkey begins successfully to negotiate membership in the European Union. What is a geostrategic issue for the United States is Europe's backyard.

Against this background, let me turn to some ideas about how we can prevent the relationship and the alliance fracturing. That would be bad if it happened, bad for Europe since most of what we want to do as Europeans can only be achieved if we work with the United States. It would be bad for America since much of what America wants is easier if America can work with Europe. And it would be bad for the rest of the world because whether you're talking about matters political or economic, the world is best served when transatlantic relations are in good shape. So how can we prevent the relationship disintegrating or constantly deteriorating into fractious disagreement?

First, we have quite simply to manage the relationship better. We shouldn't take one another by surprise. A lot of the problem in 2002 were caused by the speeches made in August by the vice president, and by the responses to those speeches during the German general election campaign by Chancellor Schroder. We have to recognize that we live on both sides of the Atlantic, in democracies. Election campaigns are not, of course, Socratic dialogues. We have to recognize that democratic pressures apply to all governments. We should give one another the benefit of the doubt. We in Europe, for example at the moment, must clearly do that in relation to Mr. Bush's appointment of John Bolton to the United Nations. Nobody should be surprised that the appointment did raise a few eyebrows in Europe. But we must hope for the best.

Second, we shouldn't allow guff to cloud a serious debate about our relationship. I lose count of the number of times that I've heard that speech telling us all that we have more in common than divides us. Some of that is true, but the work of the Pugh Research Center and others shows that there are growing divisions on, for instance, the issue of values. Americans put far more emphasis on the importance of religion in life and Americans appear to be becoming more conservative in a way, which is quite difficult for Europeans to identify with. Let me give one rather dramatic example from recent news headlines, and I merely describe, I don't seek to pass a judgment or to set out what my own position is. At breakfast a week or so back, I was reading reports in the British press of Congress and the President legislating in crisis session in the middle of the night to try to save the life of the late Terri Schiavo, a truly distressing case. My wife turned on the radio as I was reading that story on the front page to hear the eight o'clock news on which the first item was the report of the latest teenage slaughter at a high school. When there was a similar incident in Scotland in Dunblaine a few years back, Parliament was in constant session to pass crisis legislation to restrict access to firearms. I suspect that most Europeans would have thought that the Americans political system was operating in exactly the opposite way to the one with which they would have felt most sympathy.

I'm not saying that American politicians had got their priorities wrong. What I'm saying is what it would have seemed like to most Europeans. I'm a Catholic, what is called a practicing Catholic as though you spent the evenings knocking prayers over a net. As a politician I voted for time restrictions on abortion and I voted for tighter medical tests for abortion. I also voted against capital punishment, abolished capital punishment as my first act when I was Governor of Hong Kong, and voted several times to legalize homosexual conduct, for example, in Northern Ireland and in the armed forces. I believe in markets and fiscal discipline. I believe that capitalism comes within the law, not the law within capitalism. Back home I would be regarded as a fairly traditional Conservative. But to be honest with you, I'm not sure where exactly—and this is where the values come in again—where exactly I could place myself in the American political system, though I have to say that the most I've read about Senator Prescott Bush, the more I seem to think he was my kind of guy. (Laughter.)

So there are real differences between Americans and Europeans, which are bound to affect our views of the world, and those differences are likely to be even more pronounced as the century moves forward. In the past, the majority of new Americans have come from Europe, or to be strictly accurate, from Europe and Canada. Today the majority of new Americans come from the Hispanic countries to the south and from Asia. Demographers suggest that by mid-century, over half the population in the United States will have Hispanic roots. Is that really going to make no difference to the transatlantic relationship?

Third, is security. Perhaps Britain would have regarded you as free riders at the end of the nineteenth century, at the height of Britain's imperial pomp, when the British Navy secured peace around much of the globe. You then had no battleship, and the standing Army of less than twenty-five thousand. Today with rather more reason, you regard Europeans as free riders, as critics of America's security leadership who nevertheless are not prepared to do more for ourselves. There are just two points that I would like to

make about this. First, we're not going in Europe to close the spending gap on defense with the United States. You spend more than Europe, Russia and China combined. You probably spend as much as the rest of the world combined, though it's interesting that defense expenditure in America at four percent of GDP is considerably less than it was after the war, and considerably less than the comparable figures for other great powers in history. Europe should spend more on defense. At present we only spend about half of what you spend, and we should certainly spend even the limited amount that we do invest much better, with more harmonization of procurement and research. We need in Europe, for example, more airlift capacity. When we decide to deploy European, not British but European forces around the world, we have to lease airplanes from the Ukraine or from Russia, and we need to spend more on battlefield communications and precision-guided munitions. We should spend more on special forces. In Europe, we're reasonably well prepared for a battle that we never had to fight on the central German plain, but that's not necessarily the right posture for today. If we're going to be treated seriously as a partner, we have to be able to punch at least a little closer to our economic weight from time to time.

There's another aspect to this security debate. In Europe we talk a very good game on multilateralism, but if any multilateral solution requires force, then it usually requires also American participation, and too often Europeans are reluctant to accept that the maintenance of the international rule of law does sometimes require the use of force. We produced in Europe a security strategy in response to your own of 2002. I think you would have agreed with most of it, but the issue that we chickened out on was the question of the necessity from time to time to contemplate military action for multilateral purposes. If Europeans want America to define the rationale for and the legitimization of preemption in ways which we're more likely to find acceptable, then we have in Europe to be prepared and willing to deploy effective force ourselves.

Fourth, Europe spends more absolutely and proportionately on development assistance than the United States, and more of what is described as development assistance in Europe goes to poor countries and to poor people. As your own record shows, for example, in post-war Europe economic development can have a significant impact in reducing the level of threat. Poverty alleviation is relevant to living in a more peaceful world. There's also a relationship between poverty and political alienation. Of course, to make the world safer, we need to shoot crocodiles, but also, to borrow the cliché, we need to drain swamps. We're still not very good at promoting growth in poor countries. It's a particularly significant problem in Africa. I used to visit Africa regularly in the 1980s when I was Britain's Development Minister. I then spent five years in Asia in the 1990s. Going back to Africa in the last five years has been a salutary shock. If we want to see more sustainable development in Africa, then we have to work with Africans to create stable political institutions. We still have problems everywhere building institutions, effective institutions in failed states, but we know that the greatest problems today, unlike in the past, don't come from conquering states but from failing and failed states. Europe will have to be still more generous in providing development assistance and we will have to do more to establish the conditions in which that assistance can make a significant impact.

My penultimate point: We need to identify those areas where it's imperative that we work together. As the only global superpower, the United States matters everywhere, but you can't do everything everywhere on your own. In Korea, for example, you need to be able to work with China, also with Japan and South Korea, to deal with the threat from Pyongyang. We can and will provide assistance for that process, not least in helping to pay for a settlement. But we're never likely to be a significant contributor to a political settlement in Korea. We can, on the other hand, play a big role with you in Africa, in the Balkans, in the Middle East, in Iran and in dealing with Russia. In Africa we can work with you to find ways of linking the political and security clout of the African Union such as it is to the authority of the U.N. and the Security Council, and to the generosity of the main donors, but the trouble is that without an African commitment to democracy, stability, good governance and the rule of law, and one's especially looking here for leadership from South Africa and Nigeria, progress is bound to be limited. We see that today, for example, in Zimbabwe. In the Balkans we've made pretty good progress since the bloody humiliations of the early and mid-1990s. We're now pursuing a policy similar to that followed in Central and Eastern Europe, which was the most successful foreign policy, which Europe has followed. We hold out the prospect of European Union membership to those states that complete a program of political and economic reform. There are still problems in the Balkans. Some countries have difficulty escaping the dead hand of history. There are problems in complying with the international criminal tribunal in The Hague, problems of economic fragility, of corruption and of organized crime. We still also have to deal with the final status of Kosovo. But overall, in the Balkans, progress has been pretty remarkable.

In the Middle East, I hope we won't lose the opportunity provided by the death of Arafat to make progress. I hope that the disengagement from the Gaza by the Israeli defense forces goes smoothly, and that Abu Mazin is able to get and keep a grip on the security situation in the Palestine Territories. My main worry today is that unless Abu Mazin is able to point to some signs of political progress reasonably soon, he may have problems maintaining political stability in Palestine.

Iran is in some respects a similar problem to North Korea, except that the Iranians don't yet have nuclear weapons or the ability to set up a nuclear weapons production line. Iran is a great pre-Islamic civilization, which is bound to play a significant part in the future of the region. At present, Europe is in the lead in trying to negotiate an agreement with Iran, which will prevent it becoming a military nuclear power. We talk about the deployment of sticks and carrots, which as to mean what it says. The sticks have to be sticks, not carrots, and there have to be real carrots, too. We need clear guidelines and trip wires so far as Iranian nuclear progress is concerned. But we must be able to hold out the prospect of normalization of relations - if Iran can satisfy our reasonable requirements on nuclear matters. Of course if we can't get guarantees, we should be prepared to go to the Security Council. There's no point, however, doing that unless we can get the support of the other permanent member states when we get there, and that means above all China [END OF SIDE ONE]. The attitude of other member states and the attitude of developing countries will also be affected by the approach of the nuclear states to the review of the Nonproliferation Treaty, and there is in my judgment a clear relationship between what happens to Article IV and what happens to Article VI.

A more general issue concerns the spreading of democracy and good governance in the Middle East. Europe has been attempting to do something about this through a policy called the “Barcelona Process” for almost ten years, attempting to create a free trade area around the Wine Dark Sea and an area too of shared values. We have a budget of between two and a half and three billion euro in grants and loans, which supports the policy. We’ve negotiated a network of bilateral trade political development and cooperation agreements, and we’re delighted that you share our objectives and hope that we can work with you. To succeed, what is required is consistency, democracy is not an issue where you should insist on best behavior from those people, from those countries you don’t like while turning a blind eye to bad performance on human rights and so on by your friends. We’ll have to spend more in supporting the policy. We in Europe will have to be more open on trade issues, particularly agricultural trade, and we’ll have to be prepared to attach more of our development assistance to good performance in human rights and governance. We’ll also have to recognize that we’re involved in a long-term policy.

That’s not an excuse for inaction but it’s not like spreading democracy in the Middle East is not like making instant coffee. The UNDP reports, the most recent of which has just come out, showed the yearning for democracy and good governance in the countries of the Arab League, show the understanding of much of the reason for the terrible economic performance of the region is bad government, bad education and an appalling attitude to gender issues. But the objective of spreading democracy is not an impossible one. Islamic society is not culturally antipathetic to democracy. Look, as I said earlier, at the Islamic societies in Asia, which are also democratic. But our credibility in pursuing this policy will be affected if it starts to look as though it’s a short-term expedient, and it will be affected, too, in Europe’s case, by how we handle the question of Turkey’s application to join the European Union.

I hope, too, that we can agree, Europe and America, on the best way to deal with Russia. Since the enlargement of the European Union, European policy on Russia has become a great deal more realistic. One ounce of experience from Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic or the Baltic States, is worth tons of wishful thinking from Paris, London, Berlin and Rome. One issue in particular, on which the European Union and the United States should consider working together is the question of our neighborhood and the Russian neighborhood. We, like the United States, believe in strong and stable and prosperous neighbors. I don’t believe that is true of the Russian Federation. I recall saying to somebody on one occasion, or asking somebody on one occasion, where is I went to Russia I could still find the Soviet Union, and the reply came back immediately: In the Russian Foreign Ministry, but actually you see not only Soviet policy in some respects alive and well, but the policy of the later czars. If we want peace and stability in Moldova, in the south Caucasus, in the Ukraine, then Russia is going to have to stop creating trouble. It’s got to abandon its present attitude to spheres of influence, and this is a point which we should put pretty bluntly, in my judgment, to President Putin. We talk in Europe regularly about a strategic relationship with Russia based on shared values. I have to say I don’t see much evidence of the shared values.

The last issue on which we need to work together is the rejuvenation of the United Nations. The nation state has not been destroyed by globalization; it remains the main source of loyalty and communal commitment. But nation states today even America can't cope on their own, can't cope with the problems of the modern world. We all know about the benefits of globalization, but what about the dark side of globalization. Dr. Jekyll is stalked by Mr. Hyde. Nation states can only confront and overcome modern threats by international cooperation. It's true of environmental problems, epidemic disease, organized crime, drug trafficking, the arms trade, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and in particular, the terrible prospect of nuclear terrorism. It's true of course of terrorism in general. Terrorism is not going to be defeated like a traditional enemy in a traditional war, but it does require intelligent international cooperation on an unprecedented scale in order to limit the damage, which it can do. That's why the reform and renewal of the U.N. is so important. I don't think there's any issue on which it's more crucial for America and Europe to work together.

I am, as I said earlier, a conservative, a conservative who believes like the prince in Lampurdue's great novel, things must change in order to remain the same. But I said change. I don't believe in permanent revolution. I prefer Madison to Mao. I believe that the approach to global governance since World War II has been remarkably successful. It's a system, which has joined America and the European Union together in wedlock. There have been rows, as I said. We have sometimes thrown the crockery, but on the whole, the relationship has survived to our mutual benefit and the world's benefit.

So my own view of how to manage a world always full of dangers as well as opportunities, is to review and renew the approach that we've taken over the last 50 years. I've looked recently at some of the research findings about attitudes to international affairs in America and Europe, and the thing which is most encouraging is the finding that the majority of Americans, even after the Iraq war, want Europe to play a larger part in sharing in world leadership. They even want that when Europeans on issues where Europe doesn't agree with the United States. I think that's smart and I think it's understandable and I think I would take the same view. I hope that Europeans are capable of rising to that challenge. It's a challenge we shouldn't forget to which post-war American leaders—Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy—wanted Europe to respond within enthusiasm, energy and wisdom. I hope that that is what we can do, playing a part as super partners rather than supine followers or super snipers. Thank you. (Applause.)