

What Should This Fight Be Called?

Metaphors of Counterterrorism and Their Implications

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SUMMARY—This monograph examines from a psychological perspective the use of metaphors in framing counterterrorism. Four major counterterrorism metaphors are considered, namely those of war, law enforcement, containment of a social epidemic, and a process of prejudice reduction.

The war metaphor is as follows: Wars are fought by states; the enemy is thus an identifiable entity whose interests fundamentally oppose your own. The conflict is zero-sum—the outcome will be victory for one side or the other—and there is no compromise. The war metaphor is totalistic and extreme. Arguably, it was adopted in light of the immensity of damage and national hurt produced by the 9/11 attack. It has insinuated itself into the public discourse about counterterrorism, and it has guided policy, but it has also met challenges because of lack of fit and the availability of counteranalogies with different lessons of history.

Some of the drawbacks of the war metaphor are addressable in the law enforcement metaphor of counterterrorism. Unlike war's special status and circumscribed duration, law enforcement is an ongoing concern that must compete for resources with other societal needs. A major advantage of law enforcement over warfare is its focused nature—targeting the actual terrorists, with less likelihood of injuring innocent parties. Yet despite its advantages, the law enforcement metaphor exhibits a partial mismatch with the realities of terrorism. Its complete and uncritical adoption may temporarily hamper terrorists' ability to launch attacks without substantially altering their motivation to do so.

The public health epidemiological model was usefully applied to the epidemic of terror that followed the 9/11

attacks. It utilizes a partition between (a) an external agent, (b) a susceptible host, (c) an environment that brings them together, and (d) the vector that enables transmission of the disease. In the specific application to jihadist terrorism, the agent refers to the militant Islamist ideology, the susceptible host refers to radicalizable Muslim populations, the environment refers to conditions that promote the readiness to embrace such ideology, and the vectors are conduits whereby the ideology is propagated. The epidemiological metaphor has its own advantages over the war and law enforcement metaphors, but also limitations. Whereas the latter metaphors neglect the long-range process of ideological conversion and radicalization that creates terrorists, the epidemiological metaphor neglects the “here and now” of counterterrorism and the value of resolute strikes and intelligence-gathering activities needed to counter terrorists' concrete schemes and capabilities.

Framing counterterrorism as the process of prejudice reduction addresses the interaction between two communities whose conflict may breed terrorism. This framing shifts the focus from a unilateral to a bilateral concern and acknowledges the contribution to intergroup tensions that the party targeted by terrorists may make. A major tool of prejudice reduction is the creation of positive contact between members of the conflicted groups. Efforts at prejudice reduction via positive contact need to take place in the context of a larger set of policies, such as those concerning immigration laws, educational programs, and foreign policy initiatives designed to augment the good-will-generating efforts of optimal-contact programs. For all its benefits, the prejudice-reduction framework is also not without its drawbacks. Specifically, the positive-contact notion highlights the benefits of mere human interaction; it disregards differences in ideological beliefs between the interacting parties, thereby neglecting an element

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that appears essential to producing their estrangement and reciprocal animosity. Too, like the epidemiological metaphor, the prejudice-reduction framing takes the long view, thereby neglecting the “here and now” of terrorism and the need to counter specific terrorist threats.

Thus, each of the foregoing frameworks captures some aspects of counterterrorism’s effects while neglecting others. Accordingly, an integrated approach to counterterrorism is called for, one that exploits the insights of each metaphor and avoids its pitfalls. Such an approach would maximize the likelihood of enlightened decision making concerning contemplated counterterrorist moves given the complex tradeoffs that each such move typically entails.

INTRODUCTION

Though modern terrorism has captured the world’s attention intermittently since the late 19th century (Rapoport, 2004), its contemporary forms pose a particularly acute danger to orderly societies. The coordinated 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, DC, symbolic pillars of American economic and military might; the March 4, 2004 bombing of the Madrid train station; the London transit bombing of July 5, 2005; the daily suicide bombings in Iraq and Afghanistan; the political ascendancy of fundamentalist terrorism-using groups, such as Hamas and Hezbollah; the emergence of the global Salafi Jihad movement inspired by al-Qaeda; and the specter of the acquisition and use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists have made the task of opposing terrorism as difficult as it is pressing. As one commentator put it, “international terrorism [is] the most serious strategic threat to global peace and safety” (Ganor, 2005, p. 293).

As a form of intelligible human behavior, terrorism has fundamental psychological aspects. It rests on its own subjective rationality (Crenshaw, 1990/1998; Post, 1990) and is anchored in terrorists’ ideologically based beliefs about its utility and ethical justifiability (Kruglanski & Fishman, 2006). It is driven by goals it is presumed to serve for groups and individuals. It is enabled by mechanisms of moral disengagement (Bandura, 1998). And it is heavily dependent on processes of communication, persuasion, leadership, and group dynamics (Post, 1986). These varied psychological factors need to be taken into account in devising effective strategies for undermining terrorism and reducing its appeal for sympathizers and potential recruits.

As is the case with any systematic initiative, policies aimed at opposing terrorism require a guiding conception that affords a plan of action and forecasts its likely consequences. Perhaps because terrorism is refractory to a broadly accepted definition¹

(e.g., Schmid & Jongman, 1988), it has been often understood metaphorically, as has counterterrorism. In the present monograph, we review several major metaphors of counterterrorism and assess their likely psychological impacts and policy implications. Specifically, we seek to identify the complex tradeoffs, intricate ramifications, and unintended outcomes that adopting a given counterterrorism metaphor may promote.

Webster’s dictionary (1986, p. 746) defines *metaphor* as “a figure of speech in which a word or a phrase literally denoting one kind of object or idea is used in place of another to suggest a likeness or analogy between them.” In the present context we use the term loosely to denote a framing or a conceptual paradigm invoked to pinpoint the putative essence of effective counterterrorism. The use of metaphor is commonplace in the construction of new knowledge. It involves an assimilation of a relatively unfamiliar and poorly understood phenomenon (such as terrorism) to a well-known concept embedded in a different domain (Gentner & Jeziorski, 1995, p. 448). Metaphors are ways of understanding complex situations (Gelfand & McCusker, 2002). They structure thought in application to particular events. They constitute ways of simplifying complex realities, and they induce a sense of familiarity and comprehension. Metaphors enable problem setting and the generation of proposed solutions (Shon, 1993). These advantages may be offset by potential oversimplification, stereotyping, and judgmental error. In other words, the “mapping” of one experiential domain onto another may be inaccurate. As Lakoff (1990) has argued, understanding a thing in terms of a particular metaphorical concept necessarily conceals other aspects of that thing that may be inconsistent with the metaphor. Metaphors can thus hide aspects of experience from our perception.

Shimko (2004) highlighted the differences between metaphors and analogies. Both are based on comparisons, but analogies apply to “within-domain” comparisons, whereas metaphors apply to “cross-domain” comparisons. In terms of impact, analogies provide specific policy guidance, whereas metaphors frame or represent problems. Our view is that metaphors of counterterrorism construct a conceptual framework within which historical analogies can be evoked. For instance, without the “war” metaphor of counterterrorism (considered subsequently), the historical analogies to specific wars would not enter the debate.

As is the case with flawed theories generally, flawed metaphors may be abandoned when confronted with inconsistent facts. However, a strong motivational commitment to a particular metaphor may lead to a selective perception of the facts. Such commitment may be augmented by individuals’ prior investment in the metaphor’s implications (e.g., policymakers’ investment in strategic activities implied by a metaphor) and/or by the degree to which such implications serve the user’s ulterior agendas or specific interests (Kruglanski, 1996; Kunda, 1990). Adoption of a metaphor can lead to “top-down processing,” in which actors’ perceptions are biased by the metaphor rather than faith-

¹Throughout the present article, the term *terrorism* is meant to refer to violence perpetrated by non-state actors against noncombatants in order to advance ideological objectives via fear. Our analysis pertains primarily to the contemporary Islamist brand of terrorism, rather than to other varieties.

fully reflecting the realities at hand. Such biases are particularly likely when the facts are ambiguous (Hsee, 1993; Kruglanski, 1996; Kunda, 1990), as they often are in the realm of terrorism and counterterrorism.

In the present monograph, co-authored by a political scientist (M.C.), a psychiatrist (J.P.), a neuropsychiatrist (J.V.) and a social/cognitive psychologist (A.K.), we first outline our assumptions regarding the possible psychological objectives of counterterrorism. We then describe four major metaphoric frameworks in which terms counterterrorism has been characterized and consider their implications for pertinent strategies and tactics of counterterrorism. The closing discussion compares the various ways to conceptualize counterterrorism in terms of their potential contributions for controlling terrorism, as well as their pitfalls and pratfalls. Though consistent with known facts and psychological theory, our analysis is primarily conceptual rather than grounded in rigorous empirical findings. Indeed, it is one of our aims to encourage the collection of pertinent psychological data concerning various facets of terrorism and counterterrorism. Nonetheless, we feel that a comparative analysis of counterterrorism framings of the kind attempted here will be useful in focusing policymakers' and researchers' attention on the complexities of the counterterrorism effort and on the potential costs of neglecting these complexities.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OBJECTIVES OF COUNTERTERRORISM

We assume that counterterrorism has short-term and long-term objectives. In the short term, its objective is to thwart specific terrorist attacks. In the long term, it is to minimize their occurrence. From a psychological perspective, such minimization amounts to reducing a party's motivation to pursue terrorism. If the motivation to engage in terrorism persists, attempts at thwarting, however successful, may have merely temporary effects. They may hamper terrorists' *ability* to carry out attacks in given circumstances, yet, sooner or later, motivated actors may find other ways and means of doing so. Targeted assassinations of leaders may prompt the ascendance of fresh operatives to leadership positions (Kaplan, Mintz, Mishal, & Samban, 2005), physical barriers and fences may be surmounted by rocket technology, detection of metal explosives may encourage the use of liquid explosives, protection of symbolic targets may put ordinary targets at risk, and so on.

In contrast, absent the motivation to engage in terrorism, there may be nothing to thwart, hence no need to invest costly resources in interminable "cat and mouse games" with terrorists. In this sense, an approach that promises to reduce groups' and individuals' motivation to pursue violence and to discourage potential recruits from joining terrorism-using groups in the first place may seem superior in the long run to an approach that aims

to foil plans for specific acts of violence. But how does one reduce terrorists' motivation?

Recent analyses of terrorism (Atran, 2003; Bloom, 2005; Pedahzur, 2005; Post, 2005; Sageman, 2004; Speckhard & Akhmedova, 2005; Stern, 2003) imply that the heterogeneous motives underlying terrorists' activities around the globe may be subsumed within three broad motivational categories: (a) terrorists' personal traumas or humiliations, (b) the ideologies they subscribe to, and (c) the social influence of their peers and revered authorities. These motivational categories may often function in concert and address different aspects of the process that pushes individuals toward terrorism.

Empirical research suggests that ideological themes (of religious or ethno-nationalist varieties) are ubiquitous in terrorists' narratives (Atran, 2003; Fishman, Orehek, Dechesne, Chen, & Kruglanski, 2007; Hafez, 2007; Kruglanski, Chen, Dechesne, Fishman, & Orehek, in press; Post, 2007; Smith, 2004) and that such themes likely constitute important conscious reasons for individuals' commitment to militancy. Yet, personal traumas and frustrations may create the emotional push to "buy into" those ideologies. In other words, personal frustrations and pain that one is powerless to undo (having a loved one killed by an occupying force, experiencing alienation and discrimination by a majority culture, suffering ostracism from one's community in response to one's normative infractions) may translate into embracing a terrorism-justifying ideology that identifies a collective grievance said to be rectifiable via militancy (Kruglanski et al., in press; Post, 2007; Speckhard & Akhmedova, 2005). Finally, the social influence by members of one's group (e.g., pressure from peers, comrades, and venerated leaders) may instill in an individual the motivation to accept the ideological contents *they* subscribe to as true and valid.

Based on this account, long-term counterterrorism efforts may attempt (a) to alleviate as much as possible the frustrations that prompt individuals to embrace terrorist ideologies; and (b) to invalidate those ideologies, for instance by arguments that the collective-grievance claim is false, that terrorism is *not* an efficient means of addressing the grievance (if it is real), and/or that terrorism is incompatible with other important objectives and moral values. Such invalidation may be carried out by (c) a social-influence process involving communicators or "epistemic authorities" (Kruglanski et al., 2005) that the terrorists and/or their sympathizers find credible. The various counterterrorism framings discussed subsequently may be assessed in reference to these objectives.

In this paper, we describe four major metaphors in which terms counterterrorism has been characterized:

- Counterterrorism as *war* (as in the "global war on terrorism")
- Counterterrorism as *law enforcement*
- Counterterrorism as *containment of a social epidemic*
- Counterterrorism as a program of *prejudice reduction*

We now proceed to describe each in turn.

COUNTERTERRORISM AS WAR

Framing post-9/11 counterterrorist policy as a “global war on terrorism” or a “war on terror” represents a conceptual construction, a metaphor reinforced by historical examples or analogies (Shimko, 2004) that helps define the American perception of the threat of terrorism. In speeches and writings of U.S. officials, the metaphor of war is strengthened and made more concrete by references to specific past wars, such as the Second World War or the Cold War. Such references evoke distinct narratives and have an emotional and cultural resonance with the public. This dramatic framing of the threat is a departure from its portrayal by past administrations, although the United States had previously “gone to war” against social problems such as drugs and crime and earlier U.S. administrations had employed military force against terrorists, albeit in limited fashion (the Reagan administration’s actions in Libya in 1986, the Clinton administration’s actions in Afghanistan and Sudan in 1998). Furthermore, what might initially have seemed an abstraction or a rhetorical flourish—the idea of a “war” as an all-out effort against some evil—became real and literal with the wars in Afghanistan in October of 2001 and, especially, in Iraq in 2003. Whether or not the war in Iraq is part and parcel of the war on terrorism is a subject of political dispute, and critics of the Iraq war themselves appeal to a different historical analogy: Vietnam.

One question that is often raised is whether or not powerful metaphors and analogies are adopted for public consumption only, rather than actually guiding decision-making. In a study of the 1965 decisions during the Vietnam War, Khong (1992) found that the private deliberations of policymakers mirrored their public stance. American leaders were genuinely influenced by their choice of analogy (in this case, the Korean War was the dominant historical analogy). As Vertzberger (1990, p. 306) noted, “argumentation by reference to history is a vital component of policy formulation and serves as a means of persuading both the self and others.” Holmes (2006) similarly sees the Bush administration as guided by the same references that are presented to the public. In short, metaphors and historical analogies are relevant to policies. They can increase the intensity of motivation for a particular action, or remove inhibitions. They legitimize particular policies, and lend them force. In short, they exert a clear and present influence on world affairs.

The Break From the Past

The idea of a war on terrorism represents a departure from the conceptions of past U.S. administrations in regard to this problem. After all, terrorism against the United States is not a new phenomenon. It has threatened American interests since the mid 1960s, so that in 1972 the U.S. government saw fit to establish a Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism.

The Nixon administration faced Palestinian terrorism abroad and violence at home accompanying the student protest move-

ment against the Vietnam War. President Nixon tended to prefer a disease metaphor and interpreted the two phenomena as the same threat: Palestinian hijackings and a bombing at the University of Wisconsin were thus described as symptoms of the “same cancerous disease” (Nixon 1970). (The disease analogue is central to the social epidemic metaphor considered later in this monograph.) Nixon expressed fears that society would accept such violence and permissiveness and that it would be, in effect, contagious. The disease metaphor wasn’t exclusive of other negative metaphors and epithets in which terms Nixon depicted terrorists. They were defined as “international outlaws” (Nixon, 1972a, 1973; recalling the law enforcement metaphor considered later) and terrorism was said to threaten “the very principles on which nations are founded” (Nixon, 1972b).

The Carter administration had to deal with the Iran hostage crisis. The president frequently expressed a fear of anarchy and of rules being abandoned. He described terrorism as a threat to civilization, the rule of law, and human decency. The Iranian hostage crisis, in his somewhat introspective view, was a test for America. Carter brought a religious dimension to his perspective that “220 million people [are] brought to their knees not in submission but in prayer” (Carter, 1980) for the hostages’ release. Moreover, he stressed that American concern for the hostages showed that it was a moral nation with character, strength, and greatness. His speeches contained frequent references to Iranian government support of “mob violence and terrorism” (Carter 1979a) and referred to “an irresponsible attempt at blackmail . . . supported by Iranian officials” (Carter, 1979b). His focus was on unity at home, American vulnerability to foreign oil supplies, and the need to protect human rights.

Reagan came to power believing that Carter’s response to the hostage crisis was unacceptably weak. He referred to “swift and effective retribution” (Reagan, 1981) at the welcoming ceremony for the returning hostages in January of 1981. His consistent theme was the need for firmness: Terrorism would not be tolerated, the United States would not be intimidated, and its resolve would not be shaken. National pride, not national security, was at stake. Terrorism was defined as an attack on democracy, freedom, and even civilization itself. It was described as a form of surrogate warfare, which linked it to states—particularly the Soviet Union and its allies. Reagan warned that sponsors would be held responsible, and he put these words into practice in 1986 when the United States bombed Libyan targets (the capital, Tripoli, and the Benghazi region) in retaliation for its involvement in a terrorist attack in Germany. Terrorism was said to blur the distinction between peace and war. Like Nixon, Reagan favored the disease metaphor: “If we permit terrorism to succeed anywhere, it will spread like cancer” (Reagan, 1985); the world needs to come to grips with “the plague of terrorism” (Reagan, 1986).

Reagan’s rhetoric tended toward the imaginative and extravagant: At different times he called terrorists fanatical, cowardly,

cynical, madmen, skulking barbarians, vicious, ruthless, savage, criminals, thugs, despicable, repulsive, pitiless, crude, indiscriminate, evil, contemptible, and abhorrent. Terrorism was described as senseless, ugly, wanton, grisly, intolerable, and heinous. It was defined as an atrocity and an affront to humanity.

Clinton entered office determined to tone down the government's rhetoric and avoid any suggestion of a "clash of civilizations" (Huntington, 1998). His general themes were the pursuit of justice, law enforcement, and international cooperation. Terrorism was compared to other intractable global problems such as drugs, crime, the environment, and disease. These common dangers were defined as boundary-crossing threats prevalent in the post-Cold War world, part of an environment characterized by modernity, open societies, open borders, technological advance, and access to information. Terrorism was often discussed in the context of nuclear proliferation and ethnic and nationalist conflict. (Clinton was particularly concerned with the threat of chemical and biological terrorism.) Even though the Clinton administration acknowledged that Osama bin Laden had declared war against the United States, and even though Clinton used military force to retaliate against terrorism-linked targets in Sudan and Afghanistan after the 1998 embassy bombings, Clinton did not adopt the war metaphor but employed more moderate—if somewhat combative—language, such as "[not letting] the terrorists . . . have the victory" (Clinton, 1996a), "battling terrorism" (Clinton, 2000), and "[taking] the fight to terrorists" (Clinton, 1996b).

In his farewell address to the nation in January, 2001, Clinton remained temperate about terrorism in providing his thoughts for the future:

[B]ecause the world is more connected every day, in every way, America's security and prosperity require us to continue to lead in the world. At this remarkable moment in history, more people live in freedom than ever before. Our alliances are stronger than ever. People around the world look to America to be a force for peace and prosperity, freedom and security.

The global economy is giving more of our own people and billions around the world the chance to work and live and raise their families with dignity. But the forces of integration that have created these good opportunities also make us more subject to global forces of destruction, to terrorism, organized crime and narco-trafficking, the spread of deadly weapons and disease, the degradation of the global environment. (Clinton, 2001)

Terrorism is thus only one of several "forces of destruction." The question of agency—who the responsible perpetrators are—is left out.

The War Metaphor

After he came to office, President Bush initially spoke of terrorism as one of a number of "new and different threats,

sometimes hard to define and defend against, threats such as terrorism, information warfare, the spread of weapons of mass destruction" (Bush, 2001a). However, on September 11, 2001, this changed. Bush adopted the war construct immediately, in the heat of the moment, according to Woodward (2002), although Suskind (2006, p. 19) recounts that in the period between September 11 and September 20, when the "war" was first declared, the meaning of the term drifted and several "facsimiles" were floated. Woodward (2002, pp. 30–31) reports that Bush's chief speechwriter, Michael Gerson, included the sentence "This is an act of war" in the first draft of the President's brief speech to the nation on the evening of 9/11, and that other assistants (communications director Dan Bartlett, for example) supported the declaration, but that the President ordered it taken out (and stuck to his decision) because he wanted to reassure the public. However, on the morning of September 12, after a meeting of the National Security Council, the President told reporters "The deliberate and deadly attacks which were carried out yesterday against our country were more than acts of terror. They were acts of war" (Woodward, 2002, p. 45; Woodward describes this as a deliberate escalation of public rhetoric).

It is understandable that the enormity of the destructiveness of the 9/11 attacks would lead the president to reach for a comparison with the worst threat that could be imagined. Certainly the attack itself seemed to meet the requirements of an "act of war." Had it been committed by a state, the U.N. Charter certainly would have permitted the United States to use force in self-defense. Furthermore, being a "wartime President" seemed to suit Bush's personality; Suskind (2006) comments that he liked to call himself by this role (p. 72). His swift decision-making style also seemed appropriate for a crisis situation, whereas prior to 9/11 it might have been a liability. The President liked to hear "tales of combat" when he was briefed by the intelligence community and was apparently deeply interested in individual al-Qaeda leaders. Suskind recounts in the early days much boasting about putting their heads on sticks or bringing their heads back in boxes (p. 21).

Essentials of the War Metaphor

The war metaphor is as follows. Wars are fought by states.² The enemy is thus an identifiable national entity whose interests fundamentally oppose those of one's own nation. The stakes could not be higher, since the national security, indeed the very existence, of each side is threatened. The conflict is zero-sum—the outcome will be victory for one side or the other. The enemy necessarily wishes to destroy you, the defender, typically by conquering or destroying your territory. (Thus the frequent admonition with regard to Iraq, "if we weren't fighting them there,

²We also have the concept of civil war, which involves a government fighting an army of its citizens for control of the country. But since the threat in the current instance issues from outside the nation's boundaries, the basic concept of interstate war is the relevant one.

we would be fighting them here”; wars are about defending the homeland.) By “war,” we understand the Clausewitzian sense of “total war,” in which there is no compromise.

Being in a state of war has other connotations for domestic politics. National unity is required, and the population must be mobilized in support of the cause. Dissent is thus easily interpreted as unpatriotic—or even as giving aid and comfort to the enemy. Going to war calls up the values of solidarity, heroism, valor, and sacrifice. And in war, of course, God is always on one’s own side. The moral dimension is clear.

The prescriptive part of the war metaphor is also straightforward. Nations do not go to war without using military force. The solution to the problem as diagnosed has to be military. Thus, necessarily, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) must play a lead role in the war on terror (and the DOD began planning the invasion of Afghanistan in November 2001, although early on the CIA took the lead role in the fight against al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and around the world).

Furthermore, if the struggle against terrorism is a war, the President’s role as Commander in Chief must dominate his other roles. In wartime, leaders are given extraordinary powers. Measures that would not be acceptable in peacetime (restrictions on civil liberties, brutal interrogation practices, etc.) are now necessary. Thus an expansion of executive power accompanies the war metaphor.

Issues of Fit

The fit of the generic war metaphor to combating terrorism is problematic at the outset. First, there is the question of who the enemy is. The entity that attacked the United States in 2001 was not a state. It was an organization, al-Qaeda, with a territorial base within the weak “failed state” of Afghanistan, whose ruling Taliban regime was not internationally recognized. The regime in partial control of that state, which had harbored al-Qaeda, was quickly overthrown (although the Taliban still exist and are now resurgent). However, since 2001, as a result of pressures that are due only in part to the war in Afghanistan, the threat of terrorism has been transformed into something much more amorphous and diffuse. The agency behind the threat thus has even fewer of the qualities of a state adversary than it did prior to the war in Afghanistan. Moreover, even prior to the invasion of Afghanistan by the United States and its allies, al-Qaeda lacked the capacity to defeat or destroy the United States (nor is it even certain that bin Laden had the intent to do so). It posed little threat to the U.S. armed forces. It could not conquer the United States nor deprive it of vital resources.

Suskind (2006) refers to the war in Afghanistan as a “bridge” between the old and the new modes of the struggle against terrorism (p. 53) and as a prelude to Iraq (p. 79). It also seemed to end in clear-cut victory (although as time has passed the outcome appears less certain). The threat from Iraq fit the war metaphor even more easily, and it too was an effective bridge between conventional war and war on terrorism. The

initial rationale for war was that Iraq was hostile to U.S. interests, that it possessed weapons of mass destruction, and that it might give those weapons to terrorists who had already demonstrated their harmful intent. Iraq had also conquered one neighbor and threatened others, in line with traditional state expansionism. Thus, linking Iraq to terrorists and going to war with that nation on those grounds could be seen as a way of making the reality of counterterrorism fit the abstraction of the war metaphor.

The Bush administration used the “counterterrorism as war” construct to argue that the post-2003 war in Iraq is an integral and necessary part of counterterrorism, but for many the connection weakened as the war progressed.³ While most observers agreed that the 2001 war in Afghanistan was essential to diminishing the threat of al-Qaeda, whether or not they accepted the war metaphor for counterterrorism policy, the issue of Iraq provoked fierce debate both within and outside the United States. Critics of U.S. policy argue that the war in Iraq is a distraction from the struggle against terrorism. They contend that the war in Iraq actually increases the threat of terrorism and makes the United States less secure. The war gives the “violent extremists” against whom the United States is fighting both valuable experience and a popular cause: defending Islam against Western military incursions. Public opinion polls by *The New York Times* and *CBS News* in August of 2006 showed that a bare majority (55%) of those surveyed approved of the President’s handling of the campaign against terrorism (this figure was up slightly from the previous week). Also, 51% of the sample thought that the war in Iraq was independent of the war on terrorism, an increase of 10 percentage points since June of that year (Hulse & Connelly, 2006).

War Against What?

Over the 5 years since 2001, the general perception of the terrorist enemy has shifted somewhat from an entity or entities of some sort (so-called “terrorist organizations”) to an *ideology* that aspires to world domination. Despite Iraq—or perhaps because it was revealed that Saddam Hussein did not have connections with al-Qaeda—it has not been easy to develop a clear conception of what or who the enemy is. The 2006 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (White House, 2006b) defines the enemy as having a “murderous ideology” (p. 3), a movement united by an “ideology of oppression, violence, and hate” (p. 4), that wishes to establish totalitarian rule over a world empire. (It thus combines elements of the criminal and the state foe.) This enemy threatens “global peace, international security and prosperity,

³But see Gershkoff and Kushner (2005), who argue that the war in Iraq initially received public support because it was successfully framed as an extension of the global war on terror. They also note the absence of public debate over the war framing based on their analysis of Bush’s speeches from September 11, 2001, to May 1, 2003. The 2006 elections indicate, however, declining support for this formulation.

the rising tide of democracy, and the right of all people to live without fear of indiscriminate violence” (p.6). David Brooks, writing in *The New York Times* on September 21, 2006, expressed frustration:

The definition of the threat determines the remedies we select to combat it, and yet what we have now is a clash of incongruous definitions and an enemy that is chaos theory in human form—an ever-shifting array of state and non-state actors who cooperate, coagulate, divide, feud, and feed on one another without end (Brooks, 2006a, p. 31).

The Detainee Issue

Further political complications were created by the issue of how to treat captured members of enemy forces. Strict application of the war metaphor would require that they be considered prisoners of war and thus subject to the provisions of international law embodied in the Geneva Conventions. Because the Bush administration did not wish to accord its prisoners these rights, it devised the awkward category of *unlawful enemy combatants*. The treatment of detainees continues to be politically controversial, damaging to the country’s moral claims, and subject to legal challenge.

Criteria for Victory

Beyond the issue of defining the enemy, a second question is what victory in a war on terrorism would mean. How will we know when we have won? An ideal-type real war would end in the capitulation of the enemy (although real wars sometimes end in messy stalemates on the ground with no formal treaty to terminate the conflict), but the proponents of a war on terrorism do not expect al-Qaeda to issue a formal surrender. *The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism 2003* (White House, 2003) described victory as “a world in which our children can live free from fear and where the threat of terrorist attacks does not define our daily lives” (p.12) and the national goal sees the United States and its allies as eliminating “terrorism as a threat to the our way of life” (p. 29). In 2006, the revised strategy defined its goal as being to “bring an end to the scourge of terrorism” (White House, 2006b, p. 3) and to bring about the “defeat of violent extremism” (p.7) around the world. It will be difficult to tell when these objectives—eradicating a method of violence and a way of thinking—have been met.

Another problem with employing the war metaphor is that it structures expectations about victory (despite administration warnings from the start that the war would be long). At the least, it leads opinion pollsters to ask whether their respondents think the government is winning the war. Thus, according to a survey by *Foreign Policy* and the Center for American Progress in the summer of 2006, most of the experts who were surveyed (a bipartisan majority of 84%) did not think that the United States was winning the war on terrorism (Center for American Progress

& *Foreign Policy*, 2006, p.49–55). Almost 80% of the over 100 experts who were questioned had worked in the American government. Asked if they thought the world was becoming safer or more dangerous for the United States and the American people, 86% thought that the world was much or somewhat more dangerous.

On the other hand, the journalist and political commentator James Fallows (2006) thinks that the United States is succeeding and that it is time to declare victory. He claims that the 60-odd experts he interviewed are quite positive about the outcome of the war on terrorism (although they disapprove of the war in Iraq). In his view, al-Qaeda “Central” has been defeated, and a second 9/11 is highly unlikely. In Fallows’ opinion, the United States is its own worst enemy by responding clumsily to provocations. To him the answer is simply to declare that we have won the global war on terror. Maintaining a standing state of war indefinitely offers no advantages; instead, he says, it “cheapens the concept of war, making the word a synonym for *effort* or *goal*” (p.71). An ongoing state of war predisposes a nation to overreaction and maintaining a permanent state of emergency, encourages fear by raising public anxieties, and (as we would expect from the effects of a metaphor) blinds people to possibilities other than military force—such as more effective diplomacy. Fallows also argues that an open-ended war is an invitation to defeat because more terrorist attacks are bound to happen. A victory declaration could thus be a means of escaping the metaphor trap that the Bush administration set for itself.

Analogies and the Lessons of History

The generic and abstract war metaphor has been reinforced by concrete historical analogies to World War II and to the Cold War, including both the “war’s” conduct and its ending. In the context of the Second World War, two events stand out in collective memory: Munich and Pearl Harbor. These are sources of transgenerational analogies, in that they influence both the generation that lived through them and later generations who did not have the same formative experience. Both events have deep meaning in the American view of history. They are available, vivid, and persistent myths with enormous affective power, resistant to disconfirmation by new information (see Vertzberger, 1990, p. 329). In the post-2003 debate over the Iraq war, critics of the Bush administration increasingly refer to a more recent counter-analogy, the war in Vietnam. It suggests a much more negative policy outcome.

President Bush also made unfortunate allusions to the Crusades in the early post 9/11 period. Here it was probably the case that he meant the reference as a general metaphor to imply a “moral crusade” against evil rather than as a specific comparison of American policy to the Western assaults on Muslims during the Middle Ages, which is the sense in which Osama bin Laden invokes the idea of a crusade when he refers to his enemy

as “Jews and Crusaders” (bin Laden, 1998a).⁴ It is easy to misjudge the emotional effect of an analogy on an unfamiliar audience. Misplaced analogies can backfire and be politically dangerous. In this specific case they may feed negative images of the United States and fuel anti-American sentiments among Muslims.

Pearl Harbor

Woodward (2002, p. 37) reports that President Bush wrote in his diary on the night of September 11: “The Pearl Harbor of the 21st century took place today.” The Pearl Harbor analogy may be an intuitive one for trying to understand the events of 9/11, since that attack also was a deadly surprise attack from the air. The Pearl Harbor analogy supports the war metaphor because Pearl Harbor led to war against Japan. It also supports the concept of the enemy as an entity that wishes to establish totalitarian rule over a world empire (as per the 2006 strategy statement; White House, 2006a). The analogy does not fit the current adversary or even pre-2001 al-Qaeda very well, of course, as Japan was a major military and economic power fully embarked on expansionist policies in Asia. It was already an empire. Furthermore, the Japanese attack was on an American military target, not on civilians in the U.S. homeland. Yet the Pearl Harbor analogy also implies a conclusion about how a war following an unjustified and devastating surprise attack will end: victory, unconditional surrender of the adversary, occupation of the enemy’s homeland, and restoration of that enemy to the ranks of civilized nations by transforming it into a democracy. If the war in Iraq is part of the war on terrorism, then the lessons of history are clear.

The Pearl Harbor analogy may also contribute to the assumption not just that the proper response is war but also that preemption is essential to a defensive military strategy. If one is at risk of a devastating surprise attack and cannot prevent it, then (as Roberta Wohlstetter’s classic 1962 study of the Pearl Harbor attack advises, since intelligence services cannot distinguish between signals and noise) the best strategy is to preempt the adversary. Preemption (which shaded easily into preventive war) was a hallmark of the 2002 National Security Strategy (White House, 2002), although it was less prominent in the 2006 version (White House, 2006b). The idea of preemption helped justify war in Iraq. If the claim that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction had been true, then he could have been capable of a more horrifying surprise attack than 9/11 or even Pearl Harbor. (It is interesting that what Ramzi Yousef, a planner of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, bin Laden, and others invoke with regard to their critiques of the

Pacific war is the American use of atomic weapons against Japan (bin Laden, 2005; Bird & Sherwin, 2005; “Excerpts From Statements in Court,” 1998). Woodward (2002, pp. 22–23, also p. 283) reports that surprise was one of Donald Rumsfeld’s major themes when he became secretary of defense. According to Woodward, Rumsfeld handed out copies of Wohlstetter’s book on Pearl Harbor to his subordinates.

The comparison between 9/11 and Pearl Harbor remained a main theme in the Bush administration’s discourse on the struggle against terrorism. For example, in December 2005, on the anniversary of Pearl Harbor, President Bush gave a speech emphasizing the continuities between the two events to the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington:

Like generations before us, we’re taking the fight to those who attacked us—and those who share their murderous vision for future attacks. Like generations before us, we’ve faced setbacks on the path to victory—yet we will fight this war without wavering. And like the generations before us, we will prevail (Bush, 2005c).

Munich

The Munich analogy has been arguably even more salient to American policymakers than the Pearl Harbor analogy. It is pervasive and persistent in American political commentary and historical analysis. Its lesson is that any concession to an adversary is fatal; “appeasement” is the worst option to choose when confronted by an aggressor. Chamberlain’s sincere attempt to avoid war by accepting what appeared to be minor, even justifiable, demands on Hitler’s behalf only made war more likely.⁵ Restraint and patience only encouraged aggression. The enemy, as in the Japanese case, was a totalitarian empire that aspired to world domination. Germany was also a deceptive enemy, pretending to be satisfied with small gains while hiding a desire for world conquest. Victory required unconditional surrender, military occupation, and democratization, as in Japan. In both cases, the long-term outcome was highly positive: a stable and democratic ally. But if success in Iraq is defined as success in the war on terrorism, then the analogy is prescriptive.

Fascism

The reference to an “axis of evil” in the January 2002 State of the Union speech (Bush, 2002) also recalled the Axis powers of the second world war. Thus states labeled as supporters of terrorism (Iran and Syria primarily) become the equivalent of 1930s and 40s Germany and Italy. In addition, the general World War II framing surely contributed to the use of the labels

⁴But see Graham, Keenan, and Dowd (2004), who compare the President’s remarks on returning to the White House on September 16, 2001 (Bush 2001b) to that of Pope Urban II in 1095 to the Council of Clermont (Krey, 23), which launched the Crusades, calling both speeches “call to arms’ texts” (p. 200). We are indebted to Joanna Scott for drawing this article to our attention.

⁵In fact, David Brooks (2006b) referred to one wing of the conservative foreign policy camp as “Churchillians.” Churchillians “know that occasionally civilization is confronted by enemies so ideologically extreme and so greedy for domination that decent nations must use military power to confront and defeat them” (p. 413).

“Islamofascism” and “Islamic fascists,” terms used by President Bush in 2005 (Bush, 2005a) and 2006.⁶ Although the use of the label appears to date at least back to 1990 (Ruthven, 1990), well before the war on terrorism, the President’s references provoked a storm of controversy.

These analogies contribute to a view of the global jihadist movement,⁷ which was characterized by the 2006 National Intelligence Estimate” as “Al Qaeda, affiliated and independent terrorist groups, and emerging networks and cells” and as “decentralized, lacking a coherent global strategy, and increasingly diffuse” (Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2006), as being, instead, a monolithic and powerful enemy. Likening jihadism to interwar fascism makes this diverse and dispersed movement appear as a genuine, unified mass movement capable of capturing state power rather than as an ideology with limited appeal. The NIE finds that the jihadist idea of governance (a state ruled by Islam and waging relentless war—i.e., jihad—against unbelievers) is unpopular with the vast majority of Muslims. In the view of the intelligence community, then, actual jihadism does not resemble the historical examples of National Socialism in Germany or fascism in Italy.

The Cold War

The war on terrorism is also compared to the Cold War. This analogy predicts that the war will be long, a “generational struggle” according to the strategy statements, rather than conclude in a matter of years as World War II did. It also predicts that the opponent will eventually collapse if sufficient military power is exerted. Holmes (2006) gleans from Francis Fukuyama’s (2006) analysis of the Bush Administration’s Iraq decisions that the administration misunderstood the causes of the collapse of the Soviet Union, attributing it to the pressure of American military power. In thinking that an adversary can be completely destroyed by superior force, administration policymakers have apparently forgotten that the strength of the Soviet Union was consistently overestimated. The Cold War required a state of permanent crisis, with the nation constantly under mortal threat, and this perception of the world carried over to the post-Cold War world. Furthermore, the Cold War analogy has encouraged the use of tropes from that period, such as charging opponents of one’s policy with being “soft” on Communism/terrorism. Holmes contends:

⁶“Islamofascism” was first used by President Bush in a speech to the National Endowment for Democracy, October 6, 2005 (Bush, 2005a). On May 25, 2006, in a news conference with Prime Minister Tony Blair, Bush referred to al-Qaeda using the phrase “Islamic fascism” (Bush, 2006). See Pollitt (2006) and, for the other side of the debate, see Kramer (2006).

⁷Jihadism has been defined as “a revolutionary program whose ideology promises radical social change in the Muslim world. It displays a coherent set of beliefs and behaviours, which . . . give a central role to jihad as an armed political struggle to overthrow ‘apostate’ regimes, to expel their infidel allies, and thus to restore Muslim lands to governance by Islamic principles” (Charters, 2007). “The jihadism that adopts terrorism as its most recent military strategy is only one branch of Islamism. This jihadism presents a new pattern for warfare, one that is no longer waged between organized state armies” (Tibi, 2007).

Under such conditions, a counterterrorism policy that aims at extirpating the terrorist threat is bound to be delusional. Promoted by an unsound analogy with the end of the Soviet Union, such utopian impatience can also be profoundly self-defeating, especially if it prompts policy-makers to focus irrationally on the wrong part of the threat—for example, on a minor danger that happens to lend itself to definitive obliteration. Saddam Hussein comes to mind. (Holmes, 2006, p. 1)

The Vietnam War

The war metaphor also permits critics of the war in Iraq to call up a hotly contested competing analogy: the Vietnam War. As early as May 2004, the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College issued a report arguing that the military dimensions of the two wars could not be compared (and referring to a host of press articles making the comparison; Record & Terrill, 2004). They conclude, however, that “reasoning by historical analogy is an inherently risky business” (p. 61). Policymakers’ knowledge of history is often poor, they said, and they are predisposed to choose analogies that suit a preferred policy. Thus proponents of the Iraq war embraced the Munich analogy, and opponents cited Vietnam. The authors of the report acknowledge that, as in Vietnam in 1965, U.S. power and prestige have been massively committed. “Under no circumstances *other than the descent of Iraq into civil war* should the U.S. abandon Iraq as it did Vietnam in 1975” (Record & Terrill, 2004, p. 55; italics added), and we should not underestimate the insurgents in Iraq, as we did the Vietcong. The authors recommend that policymakers consider two instructive dimensions of the analogy: the need for effective state-building, on the one hand, and the need for domestic public support, on the other. Furthermore, policymakers should note that Iran might come to play the role of North Vietnam.

In December 2005, President Bush, answering a reporter’s question regarding Howard Dean, Chairman of the Democratic National Committee, who was making an analogy of Iraq to Vietnam, replied “there’s pessimists, you know, and politicians who try to score points” (Bush, 2005b). In the spring of 2006, Stephen Biddle, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, denied the relevance of the Iraq–Vietnam analogy: “Vietnam was a Maoist peoples’ war, Iraq is a communal civil war” (Biddle, 2006 p. 10). Despite this, he argued, the administration is actually following the same policies. While advocating a policy change, Biddle admits that changing policy will require replacing “a Manichaeian narrative featuring evil insurgents and a noble government with a complicated story of multiparty interethnic intrigue” (Biddle, 2006, p.12).

Understanding the contested nature of the Vietnam analogy may help explain why the administration resisted the charge that Iraq was slipping into civil war (see Sambanis, 2006) and why former secretary of defense Donald Rumsfeld dismissed the term “insurgents” in favor of “enemies of the legitimate Iraqi government” (see Milbank, 2005).

Concluding Comments: Psychological Aspects of the War Metaphor

Why does the Bush administration's conception of counterterrorism policy as a "war" matter? It seems clear that the metaphorical and analogical reasoning underlying this framing is a genuine reflection of key policymakers' views, not just a way of framing the issue in order to mobilize the public behind a new policy that is potentially more risky and costly than past responses to terrorism. The war metaphor is totalistic and extreme in its demands. Arguably, it was adopted in light of the immensity of damage and national hurt produced by the 9/11 attack. In addition, it might have suited the beliefs, policy objectives, and personal styles of key decision makers and was useful in implementing policy interests that entered with the Bush administration. It has insinuated itself into the public discourse about counterterrorism, and it has guided policy, but it has also met challenges because of lack of fit and the availability of counteranalogies with different lessons of history.

Suskind (2006) offers a motivational explanation for the relatively unchallenged development of the war metaphor and its acceptance in the early days after 9/11:

9/11 allowed for preparation to meet opportunity. The result: potent, wartime authority was granted to those guiding the ship of state. A final, customary check in wartime—demonstrable evidence of troop movements or casualties, of divisions on the move, with correspondents filing dispatches—was also missing once the Afghanistan engagement ended. In the wide, diffuse "war on terror," so much of it occurring in the shadows—with no transparency and only perfunctory oversight—the administration could say anything it wanted to say and the public was motivated to accept its interpretation in order to escape the ambiguity, and attain cognitive clarity and closure. (pp. 98–99)

The war metaphor of counterterrorism focuses on an actor who employs violence as a tactic and is defined as the enemy. The psychological rationale of war in its general sense is to bring the enemy to its knees and convince it, and its support base, that its objectives are unattainable. In this sense, the logic of warfare in its application to terrorism is to address that part of the terrorists' belief system that sees terrorism as effective, and to demonstrate compellingly that it is not (Kruglanski & Fishman, 2006).

Does this logic work? Cumulative experience (in Chechnya, Afghanistan, Iraq, Ireland, or Palestine) suggests that the use of military force to "prove" the inefficacy of terrorism may have limited success. Often, military strikes against terrorist targets may have short-term effects involving temporary interference with terrorists' ability to launch their operations but might not undermine terrorists' motivation (Kaplan et al., 2005), because of the enmity that foreign occupation typically engenders and the injustice and excesses that the waging of war typically entails. In this connection, Anthony Cordesman (2006), a strategy expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in

Washington, DC, stated that the "US . . . needs to give avoiding unnecessary civilian casualties and collateral damage *the same priority* as directly destroying the enemy" (p. 15, emphasis added). A 2007 news item (Tang, 2007) states that more Afghan civilians were killed by U.S. or NATO forces (203 from January 1 to June 23, 2007) than were killed in attacks by the Taliban (178). In response, Afghan president Hamid Karzai "directed . . . his anger at foreign forces for being careless and viewing Afghan life as cheap" (Tang, 2007). Evoking such anger is a seemingly unavoidable (if unintended) consequence of waging massive military operations (i.e., "war") against terrorists and the result of conflating the "war on terrorism" with more limited interventions in insurgencies.

The perpetrators of terrorism have often claimed considerable staying power, as well as numerous achievements on the ground. Hezbollah boasts having forced the withdrawal from Lebanon of the French, the Italians and the Americans in 1984, and of the Israelis in 2000. Hamas credits its waves of suicidal terrorism for the Israeli disengagement from Gaza in 2005 (see Prusher & Mitnick, 2005). The destabilization in Iraq, perpetrated by terrorist attacks with partial involvement of al-Qaeda, highlights the considerable difficulty of defeating terrorism by military force alone. The apparent staying power of various terrorist organizations and their survival of massive assaults by superior military powers—in a war that they themselves declared on the United States in 1996—feeds the belief that the West is vulnerable and tends to run out of steam, so that despite momentary setbacks (like that in Afghanistan), insurgency will prove effective and, ultimately, successful.

Nor is the war concept sufficiently attuned to the sources of terrorists' motivation. By framing the issue squarely in terms of "good" versus "evil" (a framing often invoked to justify a massive effort such as war) it minimizes attempts to appreciate the other side's concerns or address the frustrations and grievances that may have fostered terrorism, as well as the belief systems (jihadism) that may have lent it ideological sustenance.

Finally, framing counterterrorism as war may exact considerable costs from society. It threatens to corrupt its values, disrupt its orderly functioning, and reshuffle its priorities. We have already commented on war's all-encompassing nature. It calls for the disproportionate investment of a nation's resources, with correspondingly less left for other concerns such as the economy, health, welfare, or education (McCauley, 2007). For a nation at war, security is the overriding goal, and it trumps (or renders less psychologically accessible) alternative national objectives or ethical values. As a consequence, putative means to security become liberated from constraints usually dictated by alternative objectives (Kruglanski et al., 2002). "Collateral damage," ethnic profiling, overly harsh interrogation tactics, unlimited internment of suspects, etc., may all be condoned given the centrality of security concerns and excused by the uniqueness of circumstances the war concept implies.

Most problematic is the difficulty with war termination. Despite the Bush administration's cautions concerning a "long war" and the attempts to redefine "victory," well remembered in the public's mind is the surrender ceremony on the deck of the USS Missouri, marking the unconditional surrender of the adversary and cessation of conflict. Imprisoned by the metaphor, as long as terrorist bombs keep exploding, the war is not over, and the United States must remain on a war footing.

COUNTERTERRORISM AS LAW ENFORCEMENT

Magnitude of the Challenge to State Authority

Some of the drawbacks of the war metaphor are addressable in the law enforcement metaphor of counterterrorism. One thing war and law enforcement have in common is that they both constitute major ways in which states are geared to protect their citizens from harm. The choice between them will often depend on the perceived magnitude of the challenge—law enforcement constituting the response to a relatively restricted challenge to the state's authority, and war to a massive one. For instance, on February 16, 1993, Ramzi Yousef and his co-conspirators placed a truck bomb in the parking garage of the World Trade Center that resulted in six deaths, hundreds of injuries, and property damage not exceeding half a billion dollars (McCauley, 2007). The response to this event was entirely in terms of law enforcement, including extensive police work, prosecution, trials, and convictions. Compare this with the devastating attack on the same structure on September 11, 2001 that caused close to 3,000 deaths and untold tens of billions in damage. The response to that attack was war. The implicit attributional logic of such differential responding could be that a high-magnitude effect requires a cause of a comparable magnitude (Kelley, 1971), elimination of which requires a commensurately powerful response, in turn.

Qualitative Differences Between War and Law Enforcement

Beyond the difference in response magnitude, the war and the law enforcement metaphors have qualitatively distinct implications for how terrorism is understood and reacted to. Whereas the war metaphor is focused on an actor defined as the enemy, the law enforcement metaphor is focused on the act (the "crime") deemed unacceptable and unlawful. In support of the law enforcement approach, Shibley Telhami (2004), a political scientist and Mideast expert, argued that an emphasis on the (criminal) terrorist activities would be more efficient than "waging war" on the terrorists and their supporters. Specifically:

if American efforts focus on defeating 'terrorist means' defined as the deliberate targeting of civilians, the United States would have a better chance of succeeding. [This would involve rallying] the international community to apply the principle universally . . . In

this way a deliberate attack on civilian targets in one state would become an attack on all. (p. 10)

Similarly, Senator John Kerry, in a presidential candidates' debate in South Carolina in 2004, stated that, although counterterrorism will be "occasionally military," it should be "primarily an intelligence and law enforcement operation that requires cooperation around the world" (Will, 2006). The United Nations has never been able to agree on a definition of terrorism, but it has developed several articles prohibiting particular acts—such as airline hijacking and violence against diplomatic persons—consistent with a law enforcement framing.

Beginnings and Endings

In a recent chapter, McCauley (2007) systematically compared the law enforcement metaphor of counterterrorism to the war metaphor, and identified a number of major differences between them. Unlike wars that typically have clear-cut beginnings and endings, law enforcement is a continual enterprise. Law enforcement begins with a clear infraction of a criminal code. War is defined less clearly and is determined by "a declaration from one government to another that a state of war exists between them" (McCauley, 2007, p. 58). Unlike criminal investigation that requires investigation or discovery, war requires neither, and "an attack or ultimatum is typically the clear occasion of war" (p. 58).

Thus, in a videotaped conference that took place on May 26th, 1998, bin Laden formally declared war on the United States (bin Laden, 1998b). CNN recovered the tape in 2002 and Nic Robertson reported its content: "'By God's grace,' bin Laden says on the tape, 'we have formed with many other Islamic groups and organizations in the Islamic world a front called the International Islamic Front to do jihad against the crusaders and Jews'" (Robertson, 2002). And President Bush, in a speech to the joint session of Congress on September 20, 2001, labeled the 9/11 attack as an act of war: "On September the 11th, enemies of freedom committed an act of war against our country" (Bush, 2001c).

In contrast to the state of war, the extraordinary nature of which requires a special declaration by a nation's leadership, law enforcement is an ongoing concern, as the potential for crime is ever-present in orderly societies; it arguably serves an important function for society (Durkheim, 1947), and presumably it will even exist "in a society of saints" (Erickson, 1966, p. 4). Whereas war's special nature and presumed circumscribed duration justify pumping extraordinary resources into the war effort, law enforcement, as an ongoing concern, must compete for resources with education, jobs, housing, and welfare policy. Taking issue with the terrorism-as-war framework, General Wesley Clark and Kal Raustalia (Clark & Raustalia, 2007) argue in an opinion piece that terrorists should be viewed

as criminals, and “ought to be pursued, tried and convicted in the courts” (p. A19).

Compatibility With Alternative Societal Concerns

Because it forms part of a comprehensive network of arrangements designed to address society’s varied needs, the law enforcement approach is less likely than the war approach to collide with alternative values and rights similarly protected under such arrangements. McCauley (2007) puts it as follows: “In time of war, talk about money cost or opportunity cost or human rights cost is unpatriotic; in the criminal justice system, these costs can be counted in the balance of competing values and priorities” (p. 62).

Perceived violations of human rights resulting from the war approach to counterterrorism have evoked considerable criticism both in the United States and abroad. Washington has not been unresponsive to these concerns. Specifically,

The U.S. Supreme Court rejected the Bush administration’s attempts to exclude Guantánamo from U.S. legal protections or to prosecute alleged terrorists before military commissions that violate the Geneva Conventions. The U.S. Congress rejected a Bush administration claim that the prohibition of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment does not protect non-Americans held by U.S. forces outside the United States. These developments, coupled with revelations of the CIA’s secret detention centers and growing public pressure, led President Bush to close those secret prisons, at least for the moment. Uniformed members of the U.S. military, successfully resisting pressure from their civilian superiors, have reaffirmed rules against the abusive techniques that those superiors had authorized. (Roth, 2004)

A major advantage of the law enforcement approach to counterterrorism is its focused nature. If one conceives of terrorists themselves as an apex of a pyramid whose base is made up of sympathizers who support the terrorists’ goals even if they aren’t themselves prepared to engage in terrorist attacks, law enforcement is much more likely to target the apex and avoid the base. The law enforcement metaphor suggests precision of counterterrorist initiatives and minimization of possible overreactions to terrorist strikes, which constitute major problems for the war-on-terrorism framing.

Minimization of Costly Mistakes

McCauley (2007) points out that the costs of mistakes incurred in the course of counterterrorist operations are considerably smaller when such operations are conducted as law enforcement than they are when they are conducted as war. Civilian casualties, nearly unavoidable in bombing raids of terrorist targets when implementing the war metaphor, are unlikely under law enforcement policies. As already noted, such casualties (“collateral damage”) could represent a major factor fueling anger and increasing support for terrorist organizations (Kaplan

et al., 2005). As an Irish Republican Army member remarked, “the British security forces are the best recruitin’ officer we have” (Geraghty 2000, p. 36).

“The criminal justice system also makes mistakes, but these mistakes are more likely to lead to imprisoning the wrong people than killing the wrong people” (McCauley, 2007, pp. 62–63). In this vein, the criminologists LaFree & Hendrickson (2007) note that “The supreme penalty—execution—is used rarely in criminal justice, even in democracies such as the United States that have not banned its use” (p. 9). In contrast, the killing of innocents in war is seen as inevitable and morally acceptable, even if sad and regrettable. As Onkar Ghate (2003) of the Ayn Rand Institute put it, “The moral principle is: the responsibility for all deaths in war lies with the aggressor who initiates force, not with those who defend themselves” (p. 1); in so far as each side in a war tends to view the other as aggressor, each side treats the killing of innocents on the other side as excusable.

Focus on the Act

Another advantage of the law enforcement metaphor is its focus on the criminal act, rather than on the actor vaguely defined as the enemy. This reduces the tendency of those who combat the terrorists to stereotype them and to discriminate against (innocent) members of the broad social categories to which they may belong (e.g., Muslims, Saudi Arabians, Middle Easterners; McCauley, 2007).

Terrorism as Crime

LaFree & Dugan (2004) enumerated several major features that terrorism and crime share in common: “Terrorism, like common crime, is disproportionately committed by young males” (p. 56); “sustained levels of terrorism, like sustained levels of crime, undermine social trust” (p. 56.); and “terrorism is . . . closely related to breaking of laws” (p. 53). As Osama bin Laden expressed it, “let history be a witness that I am a criminal” (Rahimullah, 1999).

Indeed, terrorists often engage in crime as it is conventionally defined. And “while terrorist activities typically constitute multiple crimes (e.g., murder, kidnapping, extortion), for many nations a specific crime of terrorism does not exist” (LaFree & Dugan, 2004, p. 57). Accordingly,

suspected terrorists in the United States are typically prosecuted for a variety of criminal offenses rather than terrorism . . . in a study of federal prosecution of terrorists in the U.S. from 1982 to 1989, Smith & Orvis (1993, p. 669) show that the most common subjects of terrorist prosecutions have been racketeering (30.2% of the total), machine guns, destructive devices and other firearms (16.7%), and conspiracy (9.3%). This situation began to change in the United States after the mid 1990s, and especially after the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001. Nevertheless, even today, most persons suspected of terrorism in the U.S. are being prosecuted not for terrorism per se, but for a range of crimes

commonly associated with terrorism . . . (LaFree & Dugan, 2004, p. 57)

Though terrorist activities per se are often classifiable as criminal, terrorists often engage in additional criminal activities—such as drug trafficking, bank robberies, extortion, kidnapping for ransom, and smuggling—aimed at financing terrorist operations. For instance, in 1994, Jawed Naqvi, writing in the *News India–Times*, quoted Interpol’s chief drugs officer, Iqbal Hussain Rizvi, as saying that “Drugs have taken over as the chief means of financing terrorism” (Naqvi, 1994, p. 30). Because the law enforcement system is oriented and equipped to cope with criminality in its varied forms, it is ipso facto equipped to cope with those aspects of the terrorists’ operation that are criminal in the conventional sense of the term.

Police Work

But the efficacy of law enforcement as an approach to counterterrorism extends even farther. Experience of the Israelis and the British suggests that effective counterterrorism often resembles painstaking police work more than it resembles war. McCauley (2007) notes that

Effective police work requires understanding a local culture, knowing the details of social and physical geography in a local area, developing local relationships and cultivating local sources of information . . . [The] modern army . . . is ill prepared for police work or the kind of economic and community development work that can support effective police work. At a minimum, effective police work requires speaking the local language, but learning foreign languages is not typically a high priority in military training. (p. 61)

International cooperation in counterterrorism is also more likely under the law enforcement metaphor than under the war approach. According to Senator John Kerry’s comment (as paraphrased in a 2004 *New York Times Magazine* article), cooperation between law enforcement agencies has shown that “many of the interdiction tactics that cripple drug lords, including governments working jointly to share intelligence, patrol borders, and force banks to identify suspicious customers, can also be some of the most useful tools in the war on terror” (Bai, 2004, p. 45). McCauley (2007) states in this connection that

International cooperation is crucial for fighting international terrorists. International police cooperation is a better model of this kind of sharing than international military cooperation; police and security services are more likely than the military to have useful information about terrorist individuals and terrorist groups. (p. 61)

International Cooperation

Whereas the international community is basically in favor of law and order, and hence likely to support international law

enforcement treaties aimed at stopping terrorism, the war metaphor might be too committing and demanding for numerous states to embrace; it might encourage sitting-on-the-fence neutrality in the struggle against the terrorist enemy.

For instance, even in 2003, when political tensions between the United States and France ran strong because of France’s opposition to the Iraq war, there was still highly effective cooperation between American and French law enforcement that had dated to the post-9/11 period. Thus, a joint American–French investigation brought Richard Reid, the would-be shoe bomber, to justice. Similarly, France and the United States shared evidence in the case of Zacarias Moussaoui, who was allegedly involved in the 9/11 attacks. International cooperation in law enforcement resulted in the apprehension and trials of suspected terrorists in the United Kingdom, Spain, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, Turkey, and other European countries (Nacos, 2003). Nonetheless, as observed ruefully by the Secretary General of Interpol Raymond E. Kendall, one of the impediments to sharing information through the international police organization is that states supporting terrorism also belong to Interpol—in particular Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Libya (personal communication, interview with R.E. Kendall, by Jerrold Post in 1986).

Concluding Comments: Psychological Implications of the Law Enforcement Metaphor

The law enforcement metaphor of counterterrorism offers appreciable advantages over the war metaphor. It affords an approach to counterterrorism that is focused on the actual perpetrators and that balances security needs with human rights concerns. Thus, it may minimize the outrage (and support for terrorism) that civilian casualties, human rights abuses, or stereotyping and discrimination commonly inspire. Moreover, it encourages international cooperation that transcends shifting political contingencies. In view of these obvious advantages, McCauley (2007) asserted that “Criminal justice can be a treatment of choice for a chronic terrorist threat” (p. 22).

Nonetheless, careful scrutiny suggests that the law enforcement approach to terrorism also has limitations. A main issue is that terrorism, unlike typical crime, is ideologically inspired (e.g., by religious, ethno-nationalist, or political beliefs). As LaFree & Dugan (2004, pp. 59–60) noted,

criminals often have selfish, personal motivations and their actions are not intended to have consequences or create psychological repercussions beyond the criminal act. By contrast, the fundamental aim of terrorists is often a political motivation to overthrow or change the dominant political system . . . few criminals see their crimes as altruistic behavior. By contrast, many terrorists see themselves as altruistic. In this vein, Hoffman (1998, p. 43) claims that terrorists frequently believe that they are serving a cause that will achieve a greater good for some wider constituency . . .

In a similar vein, Pape (2005) concluded from his research that “altruistic motives . . . play an important role [in terrorism]” (p. 187). Gunaratna (2007) similarly noted that “what actually motivates Al Qaeda is not power, wealth or fame but an ideological belief” (p. 29). And Atran (2004) observed that terrorists “are motivated not by personal comfort or immediate gain but rather by religious or ideological conviction and zeal” (pp. 68–69).

These differences between crime and terrorism have far-reaching implications for counterterrorism. Because of their ideological commitments and collective motivations, terrorists often inspire admiration and respect on the part of the larger communities in which they are embedded. The “cult of the suicide bomber” is widespread in the West Bank and Gaza, for example. During much of the second intifada, public opinion polls conducted among the Palestinians have revealed support for suicide attacks against Israelis to be at the 70–80% level (Atran, 2004). Thus, in the recent past, terrorist activities in Palestine and other locations were anchored in a solid base of community support.

The reason this matters is that effective police work requires extensive community support, including the collection of background information and its transmittal to law enforcement agents (Siegel & Senna, 2004). As the economists Akerlof & Yellen (1994) remarked, “the major deterrent to crime is not an active police presence but rather the presence of knowledgeable civilians, prepared to report crimes and cooperate in police investigations” (p. 174). In a larger sense, effective police work requires driving a wedge between a community and the criminals living within it, and the same applies to psychological and physical separation of insurgents or terrorists from their communities. In this vein, David Ucko (2007, p. 63), a security expert at King’s College, London, comments on the successful campaign of the British and Commonwealth forces against the insurgent Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA) from 1948 to 1960. Specifically,

the construction of New Villages built as progressive communities where the Chinese villagers could own land, work, engage in local politics and move freely . . . effectively minimized the incidence of ‘collateral damage’—an inflammatory and counterproductive feature of most counter-insurgency campaigns . . . [Too] the separation of combatants and civilians made the MRLA more desperate and therefore easier to spot. Denied access to the civilian population, the MRLA found it increasingly difficult to attract fresh recruits, particularly as the political and economic opportunities afforded to the inhabitants of the New Villages had removed the primary incentive to join the guerilla ranks. Gaining information from the wider population [required] the provision of security, of services and of a political strategy deemed largely legitimate by the populace and as worthy of support. (Ucko, 2007, p. 66)

On the flip side of the coin, community cooperation with law enforcement may be difficult to secure if terrorists’ activities *are*

supported by their communities, as they often are. Where this is the case, collaboration with law enforcement is often seen as treason to the cause. For instance, according to a recent account, in the West Bank, approximately one person a day is killed having been accused of collaborating with the Israeli security forces (B’tselem, n.d.). Thus, despite the Israelis’ apparent successes in information gathering, arrests of suspected terrorists, targeted assassinations, etc., their law enforcement efforts are a daily struggle against community resistance.

Law enforcement efforts against terrorism may also be countered by a community’s perception that law is sometimes devised and followed hypocritically. For example, (a) many Palestinians would argue that the United States’s refusal to hold Israel to U.N. resolutions is at odds with international law; (b) the U.S. definition of terrorism carefully excludes state actors from any culpability; and (c) the U.S. refusal to submit to the legal oversight of the World Court diminishes the credibility of American claims of pursuing justice through law.

Finally, despite considerable policing efforts against terrorism—using organizations in various world locations, attempts to quell terrorist activities have often been unsuccessful in the long run. Various ethnonationalist movements (e.g., in Algiers, Israel, or Kenya) have used terrorism successfully to attain national independence for their peoples. The research literature on human goals (see Kruglanski et al., 2002 for a review) suggests that the higher the importance of a goal, the greater the number and variety of means to the goal that people are likely to generate. Terrorists’ ideological commitment, particularly if supported by their broader community, indicates the supreme importance that they attach to their goals.

Law enforcement operations, however successful, may be countered by terrorists’ creativity in finding effective countermeasures to counterterrorism initiatives (Kruglanski et al., in press). Difficulties of finding escape routes and the costs involved in keeping an intricate network of safe houses may prompt the “invention” of suicide terrorism. Hard-to-penetrate boundaries may lead to increased use of rocket technology that overcomes distance and barriers (Sharvit, 2005). Indeed, as compared to typical criminals, terrorists have been often credited with considerable inventiveness (LaFree & Dugan, 2004).

Ultimately, despite several advantages, the law enforcement framing of counterterrorism and the approach it implies exhibits a partial mismatch with the realities of terrorism. Especially, law enforcement methods might temporarily hamper terrorists’ *ability* to launch attacks without substantially undermining their *motivation* to do so. For example, although the Israeli West Bank barrier and military initiatives are credited with substantial reduction in Palestinian suicide terrorism from the West Bank (Israeli West Bank barrier, n.d.), in 2007 there were hundreds of Qassam rocket and mortar attacks each month launched from the Gaza strip against Israeli towns (Chehab, 2007). This suggests that terrorism is often a part and parcel of a broader,

ideologically based social movement, and in this sense it is distinct from mere crime in significant ways.

COUNTERTERRORISM AS CONTAINMENT OF A SOCIAL EPIDEMIC

Partitioning the Ingredients of Jihadist Terrorism

Both the war and the law enforcement metaphors of counterterrorism deal with the violent manifestations of terrorism rather than with the constellation of factors that may have engendered terrorism in the first place. These latter factors are addressed by the epidemiological metaphor of terrorism we now consider.

The epidemic spread of ideas has long been a subject of study. In his 1843 work *Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds* (Mackay, 1967), Charles Mackay wrote of the tulip mania that consumed the Netherlands in the first part of the 17th century. In 1636 and 1637, a speculative frenzy overtook the tulip market, with vast fortunes being spent for a single tulip bulb. Indeed, the term “tulipomania” was applied to the so-called dot.com bubble of 1995 to 2001 (Wallace, 2001). Gustav Le Bon’s *The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind* (Le Bon, 1896) addressed herd behavior and crowd psychology, emphasizing the role of the media in spreading ideas. In *Crowds and Power*, the Nobel Prize-winning writer Elias Canetti likened the spread of the psychology of mass hatred to a forest fire or a flood (Canetti, 1984).

The public health epidemiological model has been applied to the phenomenon of terrorism. This model utilizes the *epidemiologic triad*, consisting of (a) an external agent, (b) a susceptible host, and (c) an environment that brings them together. An important element of the environment is what is known as the vector. So, for example, for a malaria epidemic, such as that which almost brought the Panama Canal project to a halt, the pathogen (or agent) was the protozoan *Plasmodium falciparum*; the vulnerable host was the nonimmune population; and the environment was the tropical jungle with standing water that fostered the breeding of the vector, the *Anopheles* mosquito. A major contribution to countering the epidemic was preventive methods, such as spraying the ponds of stagnant water in which the mosquitoes bred, wearing protective clothing, and using screens and mosquito nets; chemoprophylaxis is currently employed to protect susceptible individuals who travel or work in areas where malaria is endemic.

The public health epidemiological model has been applied to the phenomenon of terrorism in two distinct senses: (a) to the targeted populations’ psychological reactions to terrorist attacks, and (b) to the spread of terrorist ideology in societies potentially susceptible to such ideologies. In regards to the first sense, the Committee on Responding to the Psychological Consequences of Terrorism, formed by the National Academy of Sciences under the Institute of Medicine, characterized the violent terrorist act or threat as the agent; affected individuals and populations as the host; the way terror is propagated, including

the role of the media, as the vector or vehicle; and characteristics of both the physical and the social environment as the environment (Butler, Panzer & Goldfrank, 2003, p. 29).

In the second sense, and of greater relevance to counterterrorism, the epidemiological metaphor was used in a recent paper by Stares and Yacoubian of the United States Institute of Peace (Stares & Yacoubian, 2006). The authors note the several practical advantages that the epidemiological approach to the strategic struggle against terrorism may afford. First, it guides intelligible questions as to “the origins, geographical and social contours of an outbreak, where is the disease concentrated, how is it transmitted, who is most at risk or ‘susceptible’ to infection, as well as why some portions of society may be less susceptible or immune” (Stares & Yacoubian, 2006, p. 88). Second, “epidemiologists recognize that diseases emerge and evolve as a result of a complex interactive process between people, pathogens and the environment in which they live” (p. 88). Third and relatedly, “just as epidemiologists view disease as a complex, multifaceted phenomenon so public health officials have come to recognize that success in controlling and rolling back an epidemic typically results from a carefully orchestrated systematic, prioritized multi pronged effort to address each of its constituent elements” (p. 88).

Stares and Yacoubian (2006) classify the factors involved in an epidemic into four separate categories of host, agent, environment, and vector. In their scheme, “The agent refers to the pathogen (e.g., a virus, or bacterium) that causes disease, the host refers to a person infected by the disease (“infective”), while the environment refers to a variety of external factors that affect both agent and host [and] the vectors [are] the key pathways or conduits that help propagate the disease” (p. 89).

In Stares & Yacoubian’s (2006) specific application of the epidemiological metaphor to jihadist terrorism, the agent refers to the militant Islamist ideology,⁸ the environment “refers to key factors specific to the Muslim world that promote exposure to Islamist militancy—conflict, political repression, economic stagnation, and social alienation. Vectors . . . refer to a variety of known conduits . . . used to propagate the ideology and associated action agendas such as mosques, prisons, madrassas, the Internet, satellite television and diasporic networks” (Stares & Yacoubian, 2006, p. 90). It is important to emphasize in this context that the pathogenic ideology identified by Stares and Yacoubian (2006) is *militant Islamism*, an ideology that may be adhered to by a group significantly larger than the terrorists per se (as in the pyramid model described earlier). Thus a broader population may approve of what the terrorists are doing,

⁸Islamism has been defined as “a religious ideology with a holistic interpretation of Islam whose final aim is the conquest of the world by all means. This definition is composed of four interrelated elements. The first is a religious ideology, the second a holistic interpretation of Islam, the third conquest of the world, and finally the fourth and the last element is the use of all means in the search for the final objective” (Mozaffari, 2007).

as well as gratefully accept the terrorist organizations' (e.g., Hamas' or Hezbollah's) financial and logistical aid to the community at large without taking the leap to killing in the name of God. Nonetheless, this larger supportive "sentiment pool" is not irrelevant to counterterrorism, as it constitutes the population whose members may be particularly prone to move to active militancy—prompted, for example, by the death of a close friend or a relative.

In specifying the epidemiologic elements of agent, host, vector, and environment, the epidemiological metaphor usefully focuses the challenges of counterterrorism on these essential ingredients, which we now discuss individually.

Ideology

It is interesting to consider more fully the psychological ingredients that make up the concept of "agent" in this model—the terrorism-justifying ideology—and that lend that agent motivating force.⁹ Basically, the key elements include (a) a depiction of some sort of *collective grievance*, (b) attribution of responsibility for the grievance to some actor (e.g., a state, a regime, or a form of governance) identified as a *culprit*, (c) portrayal of terrorism as a morally justifiable as well as an efficient *tool* for redressing the grievance (Kruglanski & Fishman, 2006), and (d) the bestowal of status and prestige on those willing to risk or sacrifice their lives for the cause by engaging in terrorist activities. Those elements may exist in any terrorism-justifying ideology, whether social, nationalist, or religious.

The ideology articulated by a charismatic leader provides a sense-making device for the group, and in identifying an external cause for the members' frustration and alienation it helps promote a potent "us versus them" social psychology, setting in motion powerful group dynamics centered on the ideology. Indeed, a principal conclusion of the Committee on the Psychological Roots of Terrorism, which developed a consensus document for the March 2005 International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and Security, was that group, organizational, and social psychology placing particular emphasis on collective identity provided the greatest analytic power in understanding terrorism and its spread (Post, 2005).

Post, Sprinzak, and Denny (2003) carried out extensive interviews with 35 Middle Eastern terrorists incarcerated in Israeli and Palestinian prisons. The contents of these interviews afford glimpses into central facets of terrorists' ideological reasoning. The following excerpt from one of the interviews contains references to three of the four ideological ingredients mentioned earlier, namely the grievance, the culprit, and the tool of terrorism for redressing the grievance:

⁹Thus, Stares and Yacoubian (2006, p. 89) distinguish "two primary strains [of Islamist militant ideology:] (1) a transnational Salafist/jihadist ideology as espoused by Al Qaeda, and (2) a nationalist/insurgent Islamist militant ideology as espoused by groups such as the Hezbollah, Hamas, and some of the Kashmiri militant groups."

You Israelis are Nazis in your souls and in your conduct. In your occupation you never distinguish between men and women, or between old people and children. You adopted methods of collective punishment; you uprooted people from their homeland and from their homes and chased them into exile. You fired live ammunition at women and children. You smashed the stalls of defenseless civilians. You set up detention camps for thousands of people in subhuman conditions. You destroyed homes and turned children into orphans. You prevented people from making a living, you stole their property, you trampled on their honor. Given that kind of conduct, there is no choice but to strike at you without mercy in every possible way. (Post, Sprinzak, & Denny, 2003, p. 178)

An ideology constitutes a belief system, and belief systems are typically anchored in a shared reality defining a worldview of a given group (Hardin & Higgins, 1996). The scope of such a group can range from a limited network of close friends and associates (Sageman, 2004) to a broader community of identity.

Relevant in this connection is the observation that group dynamics differ considerably between social-revolutionary and nationalist-separatist types of terrorists (Post, 1986). To join a social revolutionary group may mean to go underground and isolate oneself from the broader society whose workings one is attempting to alter. It is a fundamental decision, which the German Red Army Faction terrorists called *Der Sprung* ("the leap"), an act that in a certain sense may be seen as rebellion against the parents' generation that is loyal to the regime. This is the opposite of the generational dynamics of nationalist-separatist groups who are carrying on the mission of their parents' generation, which itself is dissident and disloyal to the (foreign or imposed) regime. Members of such groups are often well known and respected in the surrounding community, as they are in fact expressing its values.

Not unlike the latter, the jihadist groups are also based on a set of wider cultural values that they are expressing in practice. These are the values of radical Islamist ideology that has been growing in popularity over the last several decades (Moaddel, 2005) and that generates a continuing supply of recruits to terrorism, including suicide terrorism—an ideology that, according to Israeli terrorism expert Ariel Merari, has fostered a veritable "suicide bomber production line" (A. Merari, personal communication, January 12, 2004). To counter the growing threat of Islamist terrorism, it is imperative to understand and address the broader ideological context from which it emerges.

Scope of the Support

Major theoretical analyses of terrorism (e.g., Gurr, 1990/1998) have highlighted the broad base of support that terrorist activities require. The foundation of the "pyramid" (McCauley, 2004) consists of sympathizers with the terrorist cause who may not be prepared themselves to launch terrorist activities. This is the "sentiment pool" on whose support terrorists may count in times of need. The apex of the pyramid consists of individuals who

actually engage in terrorist operations. According to Silke (2003), “even ‘popular’ terrorist groups . . . represent a violent and extreme minority within the immediate social group that shares the terrorists’ beliefs and backgrounds. While the terrorist . . . may be largely tolerated within their communities, the number of individuals actively involved in the campaign of violence is always relatively low” (p. 30).

Gurr (1990/1998) comments that the “erosion of political support is not an immediate cause of decline in terrorist campaigns but an underlying one” (p. 94). For instance, the decline in the 1970s of the Front de Liberation du Quebec (FLQ) may be attributed to the decline of political support for its activities by the separatist Parti Quebecois. Similarly, the decline of the Weather Underground in the United States has been attributed to a withdrawal of public support from the deadly violence it perpetrated in the early 1970s. According to Gurr, “The general public’s reaction to the rhetoric, disorder, and violence of this era crystallized in . . . widespread opposition to the advocacy of radical social change and sharp resentment against groups making extreme demands or using disruptive or violent tactics” (Gurr, 1990/1998, p. 97).

Although minority groups that espouse terrorism can maintain worldviews at odds with those of the majority (Asch, 1946; Moscovici, 1980), this may require considerably greater effort than the maintenance of popular, broadly supported opinions. Maintenance of discrepant views may require isolation of the minority from majority influence and the maintenance of a strictly controlled opinion environment that assures consensus around the group’s ideology.

Presumed Efficacy of Terrorism

An important component of terrorists’ ideological belief system is that the violence they perpetrate will advance their cause. To interviewees of Post et al. (2003), armed attacks seemed essential to the operation of the organization. One interviewee stated:

You have to understand that armed attacks are an integral part of the organization’s struggle against the Zionist occupier. There is no other way to redeem the land of Palestine and expel the occupier. Our goals can only be achieved through force, but force is the means, not the end. History shows that without force it will be impossible to achieve independence. The more an attack hurts the enemy, the more important it is. That is the measure. The mass killings, especially the “Martyrdom Operations”, were the biggest threat to the Israeli public and so the most effort was devoted to these. The extent of the damage and the number of casualties are of primary importance. (Post et al., 2003, p. 179)

Another interviewee remarked:

I regarded armed actions to be essential, it is the very basis of my organization and I am sure that was the case in the other Palestinian organizations. An armed action proclaims that I am here,

I exist, I am strong, I am in control, I am in the field, I am on the map. (Post et al., 2003, p. 183)

Explicit emphasis on the efficacy of terrorism is apparent in an interviewee’s comment that “the various armed actions (stabbing, collaborators, martyrdom operations, attacks on Israeli soldiers) all had different ratings. An armed action that caused casualties was rated highly . . . An armed action without casualties was not rated” (Post et al., 2003, p. 183).

Terrorists’ concern with the efficacy of their activities is attested directly by recent data reported by Benmelech and Berreby (2007). These investigators find that, in the Palestinian context, older and better-educated individuals are assigned more important missions (indexed by the size of the population centers attacked and the civilian vs. military nature of the targets¹⁰) than younger and less educated individuals are. Specifically, the age of the suicide bomber was found to be significantly and positively associated with the attack being carried out in a big city, and the education of the suicide bomber was significantly and positively associated with the attack being carried out against a civilian (vs. a military) target. The tactical decisions of terrorist organizations to assign more important missions to older and better-educated operatives seem to be warranted by outcomes: Benmelech and Berrebi (2007) report that “older and educated suicide bombers kill more people in their suicide attacks when assigned to important targets . . . also older and educated suicide bombers are less likely to fail or to be caught when they attack” (p. 16).

If belief in the efficacy of terrorist attacks is an essential moderator of their use, one reason why people may desist from terrorism is a loss of faith in its ability to advance their cause. In an interview with the author and journalist Alison Jamieson, Adriana Faranda, a former member of the Italian Red Brigades who later disengaged from the movement, talked about questioning of “Marxism, [and] violence . . . [as] a way of working out problems,” implying a loss of faith in terrorism as a tactic (Horgan, 2005, p.148).

In summary, there is evidence that the belief systems of members of terrorist organizations include as essential ingredients the notions of grievance (e.g., humiliation of one’s nation or one’s religion), culprit (the party deemed responsible for the grievance), and method for addressing the grievance (i.e., portraying terrorism as an efficient tactic for attaining the terrorists’ objectives). Of considerable importance is the fact that, as with any ideology or belief system, a terrorism-supporting belief system is grounded in a shared social reality (Festinger, 1950; Hardin & Higgins, 1996)—that is, in a consensual support for the ideology within one’s relevant reference group, whether it is a small cluster of intimates or one’s broader community.

¹⁰Benmelech and Berrebi (2007) present evidence that larger population centers and civilian targets were perceived by terrorist organizations as being more significant than smaller centers and/or military targets.

The Vectors of Terrorism

Mosques. Post et al. (2003) report that the mosque was consistently cited as the place where most members were initially introduced to the Palestinian cause. Authority figures from the mosque were prominent in all conversations with group members, and most dramatically so for members of the Islamist organizations (versus members of secular militant groups). The unquestioning reverence of Allah and other authorities appears to be instilled in Palestinian Muslims at a young age and it continues to be evident in the individual members' subservience to the larger organization. The preconditioning of absolute acceptance of authority seems to be most explicit among members of the Islamist groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad. One Islamist interviewee stated:

My initial political awareness came during the prayers at the mosque. That's where I was also asked to join religious classes. In the context of these studies, the sheik used to inject some historical background in which he would tell us how we were effectively evicted from Palestine. The sheik also used to explain to us the significance of the fact that there was an IDF military outpost in the heart of the camp. He compared it to a cancer in the human body, which was threatening its very existence. At the age of 16 I developed an interest in religion. I was exposed to the Moslem Brotherhood and I began to pray in a mosque and to study Islam. The Koran and my religious studies were the tools that shaped my political consciousness. The mosque and the religious clerics in my village provided the focal point of my social life. (Post et al., 2003, p. 177)

Madrasahs. Do the madrasahs, Muslim religious schools, (e.g., in Pakistan, Indonesia, or Saudi Arabia) constitute breeding grounds for terrorism, and should they, therefore, be subject to tight governmental supervision and control? Different views have been expressed on this topic with little hard evidence brought in their support. The emerging consensus among experts seems to be that (a) there do exist radical madrasahs that preach extremist views and that encourage jihadism, although many madrasahs focus squarely on religious teachings and eschew politics; (b) if anything, the radical madrasahs impart the jihadist ideology and foment a positive attitude toward jihad as opposed to providing actual training in the tactics of terrorism and insurgency; and (c) attending the madrasahs isn't a necessary condition for recruitment to, or embarkation upon, terrorism.

In a *New York Times* article titled "The Madrasah Myth," journalists Bergen and Pandey (2005) examined the educational background of 75 terrorists involved in some of the major anti-Western attacks. They concluded that madrasahs are not an important source of recruits to terrorism:

While madrasahs may breed fundamentalists . . . such schools do not teach the technical or linguistic skills to be an effective terrorist. Indeed, there is little or no evidence that madrasahs produce terrorists capable of attacking the West. . . . We found that a

majority of them are college educated, often in technical subjects like engineering . . . Of the 75 terrorists . . . only nine attended madrasahs, and all of those played a role in one attack—the Bali bombing. Even in this instance, however, five college educated 'masterminds'—including two university lecturers—helped to shape the Bali plot. (Bergen & Pandey, 2005, p. A23)

Self-Recruitment. In a recent report, Rik Coolsaet, a professor of international relations at Ghent University in Belgium (2005), describes evidence from European security agencies for a "growing tendency of self-radicalization and self-recruitment of individuals [so that] self recruitment now appears to have become a more important source of jihadi recruitment than any organised international network of recruiters" (p.6). Coolsaet (2005) characterizes self-recruitment as

the result of an individual track of self-radicalization outside usual meeting places such as mosques. It more often than not involves individuals with college education (Bergen & Pandey, 2005). . . . It mixes a psychological process of personal *reidentification* . . . implying searching (through chat rooms, prisons, backroom meetings) for others with a similar world view . . . In this process groupthink gradually eliminates alternative views, simplifies reality and dehumanizes all who are not subscribing to their extreme views. (pp. 6–7)

Indeed, it is now estimated that some 80% of new recruits to the global Salafi jihad emerge from the diaspora—sons and daughters of Muslim émigrés to Western Europe who emigrated for a better life. Not having found acceptance within the host society, they have become radicalized within radical mosques in Great Britain, Germany, France, Belgium, The Netherlands, Spain, etc. (Post & Sheffer, 2007).

Experts agree that the Internet now plays an important role in the radicalization and self-recruitment process into terrorist groups; in epidemiologic terms, it constitutes a major vector affording the spread of extremist ideologies. It targets potential recruits' "soft spots" and inflames their imaginations. Army Brigadier General John Custer, head of intelligence at central command, responsible for Iraq and Afghanistan, stated on *60 Minutes* in 2007 that "Without doubt, the Internet is the single most important venue for the radicalization of Islamic youth" (Pelley, 2007). The *60 Minutes* segment with Custer further stated that "The number of [jihadi] Internet sites has exploded since 9/11. It is estimated that there are over 5,000 today."

To illustrate the role of the Internet as a conduit of terrorists' tactical planning, consider the following message that appeared on an al-Qaeda Web site 4 months before the Madrid train station bombing of March, 2004.

In order to force the Spanish government to withdraw from Iraq, the resistance should deal painful blows to its forces . . . It is necessary to make the utmost use of the upcoming general election in March next year. We think that the Spanish government could not tolerate

more than two, maximum three blows, after which it will have to withdraw as a result of popular pressure. If its troops remain in Iraq after these blows, the victory of the Socialist Party is almost secured, and the withdrawal of the Spanish forces will be on its electoral program. (Lia & Hegghammer, 2004)

With the increasing role of the Internet in the socialization of youth, there is a growing hazard of extremist ideas propagated on the Internet contributing to a virtual community of hatred (Post, 2007). Well aware of efforts to counter this vector, al-Qaeda has provided the following counsel to Muslim Internet professionals:

Due to the advances of modern technology, it is easy to spread news, information, articles and other information over the Internet. We strongly urge Muslim Internet professionals to spread and disseminate news and information about the Jihad through e-mail lists, discussion groups, and their own websites. If you fail to do this, and our site closes down before you have done this, you may hold you to account before Allah on the Day of Judgment . . . This way, even if our sites are closed down, the material will live on with the Grace of Allah. (Azzam Publications, 2001)

Gabriel Weinman, a political scientist at Haifa University in Israel (2004) conducted a 6-year study of terrorists' use of the Internet. In commenting on the role it plays in recruitment and mobilization, he wrote,

In addition to seeking converts by using the full panoply of website technologies (audio, digital video, etc.) to enhance the presentation of their message, terrorist organizations capture information about the users who browse their websites. Users who seem most interested in the organization's cause or well suited to carrying out its work are then contacted. Recruiters may also use more interactive Internet technology to roam online chat rooms and cybercafes, looking for receptive members of the public, particularly young people. Electronic bulletin boards and user nets (issue-specific chat rooms and bulletins) can also serve as vehicles for reaching out to potential recruits. [Furthermore] some would-be recruits use the Internet to advertise themselves to terrorist organizations. . . . More typically, however, terrorist organizations go looking for recruits rather than waiting for them to present themselves.

The SITE Institute, a Washington, D.C.-based terrorism research group that monitors al Qaeda's Internet communications, has provided chilling details of a high-tech recruitment drive launched in 2003 to recruit fighters to travel to Iraq and attack U.S. and coalition forces there. Potential recruits are bombarded with religious decrees and anti-American propaganda, provided with training manuals on how to be a terrorist, and—as they are led through a maze of secret chat rooms—given specific instructions on how to make the journey to Iraq. (p. 8)

Although the Internet may be an invaluable tool in the recruitment of terrorist operatives, it is unlikely to constitute a sufficient medium for recruitment. Before they become a part of

potential recruits' world view, sufficiently crystallized to stir them to action, the notions espoused on terrorists' Web sites need to be integrated into their shared reality, evolved through intensive discussion with trusted friends and members of their inner circle (Hardin & Higgins, 1996). In a recent report on the recruitment of Islamist terrorists in Europe, Taarnby (2005) writes that

While there have been examples of top-down recruitment the general trend both before and after 11 September 2001 is largely a bottom-up process. While many European Muslims were sensitized to current issues on the Internet and developed a sense of collective social identity through it, none went straight from interacting on the Internet to Jihad. Personal acquaintances are still required. (p. 50)

In the same vein, Sageman's (2004) work on terrorist networks finds that face-to-face interaction among friends was a major ingredient in the formation of action-oriented cells such as those involved in the March '04 Madrid or the July '05 London bombings.

Counterterrorism on the Internet

The Internet affords significant possibilities for counterterrorism as well. Two seem of particular interest, related to information gathering about terrorist activities and counterterrorism argumentation respectively. Information-gathering activities may include efforts to infiltrate the most heavily secured terrorist Web sites and chat rooms in the guise of potential recruits for terrorist missions. For instance, the SITE (Search for International Terrorist Entities) Institute, "through [its] continuous and intensive examination of extremist websites, public records, and international media reports, as well as through undercover work on both sides of the Atlantic . . . locates links among terrorist entities and their supporters" (SITE Institute, 2007). According to the *Christian Science Monitor*, "information on the SITE website was used within hours of posting to prevent a terrorist attack in Iraq, demonstrating that third party analysis has become a key component of intelligence" (Katz, 2007). Furthermore, "the SITE institute has provided intelligence to foreign governments that has aided in preventing jihadists from leaving European countries to join jihadists in foreign countries to attack coalition forces . . . The European governments determined that the intelligence was indeed actionable and promptly detained the individuals" (Katz, 2007).

Counterterrorism argumentation on the Internet is exemplified by the Saudi *Al-Sakinah* ("Tranquility") campaign, an "independent initiative for online dialogue with Islamists in order to prevent the spread of extremist views via the internet" (Yehoshua, 2006). In this project "some 40 ulema [Islamic clerics] and propagators of Islam who have Internet skills enter extremist websites and forums and converse with the participants in order to bring them to renounce their extremist ideas" (Yehoshua,

2006). This initiative, assisted by psychological and sociological experts in addition to Sunni clerics, is claimed by the organizers to have been “successful in persuading extremists to renounce their views” (Yehoshua, 2006).

In summary, the vector component of the epidemiological metaphor focuses attention on several potentially important conduits of terrorist rhetoric: radical mosques, madrassas, 24/7 cable channels such as al Jazeera, and increasingly extremist Web sites on the Internet.¹¹ Though possibly insufficient in and of itself to effect conversion to a terrorism-justifying ideology or recruitment for terrorist missions, exposure to such a rhetoric might be necessary to provide the guiding conceptual frame within which embarkation on a terrorism project is carried out.

Susceptible Populations and Contributing Situations

Socialization. The epidemiological metaphor highlights the importance of susceptibility to terrorist rhetoric and its determinants. It is possible to distinguish two general categories of such determinants: (a) early socialization to a terrorism-justifying ideology producing the susceptible “host” category of the metaphor, and (b) current personal circumstances that render such ideology appealing, paralleling the “environment” category. Post (2005) writes about cases in which ideological education into a terrorism-glorifying ideology was established early in the socialization process, so that “hatred [was] bred in the bone” (Post, 2005, p. 615).

Young children’s mentality is especially malleable and vulnerable to persuasion by adults, who constitute revered “epistemic authorities” for their targets (cf. Kruglanski et al., 2005). According to an Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center report, children in the Hezbollah Shi’ite youth movement known as the Imam al-Mahdi Scouts range in age from 8 to 16, number in the tens of thousands, and are indoctrinated with the ideology of radical Iranian Islam (“Hezbollah’s Shi’ite Youth Movement,” 2006). The report quotes *Ruz al Yusuf*, an Egyptian newspaper, as saying that the group’s objective is “to train [a] high caliber Islamic generation of children who would be willing to sacrifice themselves for the sake of Allah” (“Hezbollah’s Shi’ite Youth Movement,” 2006). Kindergarten children are an important target audience for the educational efforts of Hamas. On May 31, 2007, the Hamas Al-Aqsa satellite TV channel featured an end-of-the-year party for kindergarten members of the Al-Mujamma’ al-Islami society (a Muslim Brotherhood Society operating in the Gaza Strip). The children paraded in camouflage suits, carried plastic rifles, and demonstrated various military exercises. Then one of the children posed a series of questions that were

answered in the unison by the group: “Who is your model?” “The prophet Muhammad.” “What is your path?” “Jihad.” “What is your greatest aspiration?” “To die for the sake of Allah!” (Intelligence & Terrorism Information Center, 2007). In brief, then, the adoption of ideological goals (such as jihad) can represent a shared reality deliberately engineered by an organization and inculcated in its members from an early age.

Personal Circumstances. Personal suffering and frustrations can render individuals particularly vulnerable to terrorism-justifying ideologies. Many of the interviewees of Post et al. (2003) reported growing up or currently living in repressed or limited socioeconomic conditions. Their ability to work was regulated, their ability to travel freely was severely restricted, and they report having felt unable to advance economically. There was a common theme of having been “unjustly evicted” from their land, of being relegated to refugee status, or living in refugee camps in a land that was once considered theirs. Many of the interviewees expressed a sense of despair about the future under Israeli rule. Few of the interviewees were able to identify personal goals that were separate from those of the organization to which they belonged. Most interviewees reported that the families of fallen or incarcerated members enjoyed enhanced social status. Success within the community was defined as fighting for “the cause”—liberation and religious freedom were the values that defined success, not necessarily academic or economic accomplishment. As the young men adopted this view of success, their own self-image became more intimately intertwined with the success of the organization. With no other means to achieve status and success, the organization’s success became central to individual identity and provided a “reason for living.”

In a recent analysis of terrorists’ motivations, Kruglanski et al. (in press) suggested that personal traumas stemming from having a relative or friend killed by the enemy, humiliation and shame delivered at the hands of one’s fellow group members, and alienation and estrangement felt by Muslim minorities in European diasporas (Sageman, 2004) may all produce a sense of significance loss, prompting the quest for significance restoration through the adoption of collectivistic causes.

Speckhard & Akhmedova (2005) carried out an extensive study of Chechen suicide terrorists via interviews with their family members and close associates and with hostages who spoke with the terrorists during the 3-days siege in Moscow’s Dubrovka theater in October, 2002. All of the interviewees mentioned traumatic events that appeared to alter the course of the fallen terrorists’ lives. Accordingly, the authors concluded: “[W]hen we looked for the primary motivation in our sample of terrorists we would have to say that it was *trauma* in every case” (Speckhard & Akhmedova, 2005, p. 25). Of particular interest was Speckhard and Akhmedova’s (2005) observation that suicide terrorists sought out ideological inspiration in response to their personal traumas. Specifically,

¹¹Besides serving as a recruitment tool, the numerous Web sites used by terrorist organizations convey operational knowledge regarding the production of explosives and the construction of rockets, constitute an avenue of communication between command centers and operational infrastructures, and accomplish important fund-raising functions.

In the interviews concerning the accomplished suicide terrorists, eighty-two percent (28/34) were secular Muslims prior to their experiences of trauma. Of these, twenty-seven had no prior relationship to fundamental militant groups but sought out the Wahhabists radical groups in direct reaction to the traumas they had endured, knowing full well of the groups' beliefs and terroristic practices (p. 22).

It appears then that personal trauma, feelings of alienation, and disenfranchisement may spur a quest for significance that, in cases of a severe intergroup conflict, may be afforded by a terrorism-justifying ideology.

In summary, personal suffering and frustrations represent a significance loss, motivating the quest for significance restoration. Where the direct restoration of one's lost sense of personal significance seems impossible, the individual may seek to accomplish this restoration indirectly through alternative means, including an identification with a collective loss (one's group's relative deprivation) that affords a clear path to renewed significance via participation in militancy and terrorism. Thus, through a kind of "collectivistic shift"—or fusion of one's personal identity with that of the group—individual powerlessness may be overcome by an empowering collectivistic ideology in which name terrorist acts are carried out (Post et al., 2003). Adoption of ideologically based means (terrorism in this instance) may constitute a substitute vehicle for significance restoration if individual means for doing so are thwarted (Kruglanski et al., 2002). The ideologies elucidate what a significance gain according to one's group consists of, and they afford a way of preventing a significance loss through adherence to these ideological dictates.

The notion of population susceptibility inherent in the epidemiological metaphor draws attention to the motivational bases of participation in terrorism. These include (a) ideological frames that identify collectivistic goals for individuals and that portray terrorism as an effective and morally warranted means to achieve these goals, and (b) personal circumstances that affect individuals' readiness to subscribe to these ideological frames. By implication, *immunization* of the susceptible population can occur when there are alternate pathways for success within society, when bright educated individuals can succeed and do well within their culture rather than being driven to strike out in despair.

Concluding Comments: Psychological Implications of the Epidemiological Metaphor

In its fourfold partition between ingredients of terrorism (including the "agent"/ideology, the "vector"/communication sources, the "host"/susceptible populations, and the "environment"/predisposing situational factors), the epidemiological metaphor is more comprehensive than either the war or the law enforcement metaphors. It addresses at once the individual level of analysis represented in the focus on the susceptible popula-

tion, the social/organizational level represented in the focus on the vector that accomplishes recruitment and indoctrination of potential terrorists (e.g., via the Internet, mosques, or radical madrassas), and the cognitive level of analysis represented in the focus on the ideological "virus" (radical beliefs and terrorism-justifying arguments). Thus, it implies a varied array of efforts meant to counteract and discourage the development of attitudes and beliefs likely to translate into terrorism: Individual disaffections may need to be ameliorated in order to reduce people's readiness to buy into terrorism-warranting ideologies, and the ideologies themselves may need to be countered by credible authorities presenting cogent counterarguments to the extremist rhetoric—especially countering the extremist messages found on radical Web sites and sermons of radical imams preached in the mosques.

More than an alternative metaphoric framing of the counterterrorism effort, the epidemiological metaphor implies the need to focus particular attention on the ideological struggle against jihadist extremists, with the aim of winning the hearts and minds of potential recruits to jihadism. Indeed, in 2007 al-Qaeda intensified its propaganda efforts, releasing a video every 3 days aimed to generate substantially more recruits and support for its cause. (Gunaratna, 2007).

In an attempt to counteract this "virulent" lobbying enterprise, moderate Muslim communities and governments in states with substantial Muslim populations (e.g., in Singapore, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Afghanistan, Indonesia, and Pakistan) have initiated systematic deradicalization programs designed to "cure" detainees suspected of terrorism of adherence to their ideology and to "immunize" youths who might find it appealing against such ideology. We have already mentioned the on-line dialogue with jihadists by moderate clerics and jurists supported by the Saudi interior ministry. In addition, there exists a program carried out in Saudi prisons in which moderate Muslim clerics, abetted by psychologists and sociologists, attempt to dissuade the detainees from their ideology and incite them to abandon their radical beliefs (Boucek, 2007).

A particularly comprehensive deradicalization effort directed at Al-Jemah Al-Islamiya detainees in Singapore was launched in 2003 by the Religious Rehabilitation Group, a Muslim organization based in the Khadija Mosque of that city. In addition, the Taman Bacaan, or "After Care" organization (bin Kader, 2007), attends to the needs of the detainees' families and organizes educational and media events (workshops, lectures, artistic performances) for Singaporean youths (Muslim as well as non-Muslim) designed to carry an ideological antidote to jihadism.

What is uniquely impressive about the Singaporean deradicalization efforts is their psychological comprehensiveness. Specifically, they target not only the minds (i.e., ideological beliefs) of the detainees and potential recruits to terrorism but also their hearts (i.e., feelings and desires). Just as the anger at the West (fueled by the al-Qaeda propaganda machine through

messages and videos portraying the suffering of Muslims in the hands of their enemies) may increase Muslims' readiness to open up to vengeful interpretations of Islam, so assuaging the detainees' anger and frustrations by showing authentic concern for their families, actually funding their children's education (through private donations), and offering professional training for their wives may increase their readiness to open up to moderate religious interpretations and to accept the notion that jihadism is contrary to the humane principles on which Islam is founded. Similarly, the twin efforts to address the concerns of the detainees and those of their communities (and families) supports the classic psychological principle that changing an individual's belief systems (ideology in this case) requires changing the norms of the group to which the individual belongs (Lewin, 1947). Though such deradicalization efforts are promising and constructive, their actual socio-psychological impact is in need of careful evaluation. Assessment of these programs poses, therefore, an important challenge for psychological researchers.

Finally, it is noteworthy that whereas the war and the law enforcement metaphors address the proximal "here and now" of terrorist activities, the epidemiological metaphor highlights the long-term motivational, cognitive, and social/organizational processes that increase the likelihood of terrorism. Nonetheless, all three metaphors approach terrorism as an *external* problem in need of treatment via action against its actual and/or potential perpetrators. In contrast, the analysis considered next views terrorism as a "two way street," focused on the social relations between terrorists and their potential targets.

COUNTERTERRORISM AS PREJUDICE REDUCTION

Framing counterterrorism in terms of prejudice reduction maintains the focus on terrorism's broad base of support while adding a dimension largely absent from the metaphoric frames we discussed previously. Instead of focusing exclusively on the perpetrators of terrorism, it addresses the interaction between two communities whose intergroup conflict may breed terrorism. This shifts the focus from a unilateral to a bilateral concern and acknowledges the contribution to intergroup tensions that the party targeted by terrorists may make. The main premise of the prejudice-reduction framing is that terrorists represent a subset of a group of people who have an unfavorable attitude toward another group of people. Interviews with non-state terrorists, trial transcripts, terrorist writings, public pronouncements, and Internet communications suggest that terrorists typically harbor highly negative sentiments toward those they target for attacks (Alexander 2002; Cordes, 2001; Oliver & Steinberg 2005). Hence, terrorism could be viewed as one expression of tense and deteriorating intergroup relations. A particularly poignant example of a deteriorating interaction between groups, potentially prompting radicalization and extremism, concerns the relations between Muslim immigrants in Europe and the (ethnically) native European populations. We begin the discussion with the

story of the perpetrators of the infamous attacks of September 11, 2001 on New York and Washington.

Intergroup Relations in Western Europe

On that fateful date, three young Muslims—Mohamed Atta, Marwan al Shehhi, and Ziad Jarrah—each piloted an airplane in a spectacular strike on a monument of American military or economic power. Atta is thought to have been the tactical leader of the 9/11 plot. Ramzi Binalshibh, who shared an apartment with the first two, probably facilitated the plot. All four were apparently radicalized while living in Hamburg, Germany, and were probably influenced, at least in part, by cleric Mohammed Haydar Zammar at the Quds Mosque (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States, 2004). One of the most important discoveries of the 9/11 investigation was that young Muslims who had spent substantial time living and working in Western Europe could become principals in the most infamous anti-Western terrorist act in history.

The story of the 9/11 cell is hardly unique. Since then, a series of attacks, interrupted attacks, or plots has been linked to other young Muslims from European backgrounds: On December 22, 2001, Bromely-born Richard Reid attempted to blow up an American Airlines flight en route from London to Miami. He had apparently converted to Islam while incarcerated in Feltham young offenders' institution and is thought to have become radicalized while attending the Brixton Mosque in south London (BBC News, 2001).

On November 2, 2004, Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh was murdered by a 26-year-old Amsterdam-born Mohammed Bouyeri, who apparently became radicalized in 2003, perhaps influenced by visits to the El Tawheed Mosque in Amsterdam (BBC News, 2005). Also in 2004, Operation Crevice by the British Metropolitan and local police led to discovery of a 1,300-pound cache of ammonium nitrate, used in making explosives, and the arrest of seven young British Muslim men, including 24-year-old Omar Khyam, accused of plotting to bomb targets including a shopping mall and a nightclub (Rotella, 2006a). In late 2005, French police arrested 35-year-old Safe Bourada and 31-year-old Oussani Cherifi; both were of Algerian descent, both grew up in the tough suburbs of Paris, and both were accused of organizing multiple bloody plots for the Salafist Group for Call and Combat (known by its French initials GSPC; Rotella, 2006b).

The life stories of the Madrid train bombers of March 11, 2004; of the London transport bombers of July 7, 2005; and of those suspected in a U.K. plot publicly revealed in August 2006 to blow up airlines en route to the United States have also been documented. Most recently, eight Muslim doctors or doctors-in-training working in British hospitals were arrested in connection with two attempts to explode car bombs in downtown London on June 29, 2007 and an attempt on the subsequent day to ram a flaming Jeep into the main entrance of Glasgow airport. All of the known perpetrators and suspects in these varied incidents were

young Muslim men who had either been born and raised in, or lived and worked for extended periods of time in, Western Europe. In terms of McCauley's (1991) pyramid model, these individuals represent the tiny apex of a much larger group: the disaffected Muslim diaspora population of Western Europe.

The size of the Muslim population in Europe and its increasing proportionality in European societies can be explained by two factors: (a) the considerably greater natural growth of the Muslim population than that of Europe's ethnically native populations¹² (the United Kingdom's National Intelligence Council predicts that Europe's Muslim population will double by 2025; Hunter, 2002; Nielsen, 1999; Pauly, 2004); and (b) the unprecedented migration of people from underdeveloped, often politically oppressed Muslim states into Europe. The actual Muslim population of most European nations is unknown due to restrictions on gathering religion data, but estimates put the current number of Muslims in Europe between 15 and 20 million, or 4 to 5% percent of Europe's total population.

The problem is that Muslims and non-Muslim Europeans are failing to integrate. Data confirm the development of highly negative attitudes on both sides of the divide, defining an EU-wide apartheid reminiscent in many ways of the state of relations between Blacks and Whites in the mid-20th-century United States. Several factors might be contributing to this problem: cultural differences in values and world views separating Muslim and non-Muslim Europeans (Huntington, 1998); the sheer size of the immigrant population, affording newcomers a coherent shared reality (Hardin & Higgins, 1996) distinct from that of the host countries and reducing their psychological need to integrate (Kosic, Kruglanski, Pierro, & Mannetti, 2004); and a lack of consistent immigration policies in EU countries, breeding uncertainty and intergroup tension (Kosic et al., 2004).¹³

Attitudes of the Muslim Diaspora Community

In a 2006 telephone survey by the Pew Global Attitudes Project, Muslims in Great Britain, France, Germany, and Spain were asked, "What do you consider yourself first? A citizen of your country or a Muslim?" With the exception of Spain, where the percentage of religious (46%) versus national (42%) identifi-

cations was about equal, the overwhelming majority of these European Muslims embraced their religious identity ahead of their national identity (81% vs. 7% in the United Kingdom, 69% vs. 3% in France, and 66% vs. 13% in Germany). Strikingly, the religious identification of European Muslims was higher than that reported by Muslims in Egypt, Turkey, or Indonesia. For comparison purposes, 59% of Christians in Great Britain, 83% in France, 59% in Germany, and 60% in Spain put their national identity first (Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2006a).

These data tell us that European Muslims tend to hold strikingly different identity attitudes than do non-Muslim Europeans. The typical young Muslim living in Western Europe identifies him- or herself as belonging to a separate community—a religious collectivity not bound by geography or temporal limits—consistent with a stereotype about European Muslims held by many non-Muslim Europeans. In this vein, Roy (2004) writes of the recent emergence of Islamic Neofundamentalism, "a view of Islam that rejects the national and statist dimension in favor of the *ummah*, the universal community of all Muslims, based on sharia [Islamic law]" (p. 1). According to Roy, "Neofundamentalism has gained ground among rootless Muslim youth, particularly among second- and third-generation migrants in the West. These Muslims experience a deterritorialization of Islam" (p. 2).

The 2006 Pew Global Attitudes Project reveals that about half of British, German, French, and Spanish Muslims regard Western people as selfish, arrogant, greedy, immoral, and violent. There is general agreement on both sides that relations are bad between Muslims and Western people but sharp disagreement about who is to blame: Between 58% and 70% of both Muslims and non-Muslims in Great Britain, France, and Germany say that intergroup relations are bad, with large proportions of the Muslims explicitly blaming Westerners for the poor quality of the relationship and vice-versa (Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2006b).

Such attitudes are potential harbingers of violent intergroup conflict. For example, 24% of British Muslims and 35% of French Muslims endorse the statement that violence against civilian targets is sometimes or rarely justified in the service of Islam. Averaging the respondents' attitudes toward native Europeans and their support for terrorism, it appears that roughly 44% of European Muslims in the countries surveyed hold very negative views of Westerners and 24.25% are actually sympathetic to terrorism. Multiplying by the mean estimate of their total population (17.5 million), one might conclude that about 7.7 million Muslims living in Europe dislike Westerners and more than 4.2 million are sympathetic to terrorism. These could serve as substantial pools from which active terrorists might be drawn.

Islamophobia

Europeans feel threatened, angered, and rejecting toward their new Muslim neighbors. There are variations within this trend.

¹²Between 1965 and 1990, the world's population rose from 3.3 to 5.3 billion, with an overall annual growth rate of 1.85%. Muslim societies, however, exhibited growth rates from 2 to 3% (United Nations Population Division, 1993). Meanwhile, the European Union's ethnically native population has not even been replacing itself since 1973, when, for the first time, the fertility rate fell below the critical replacement rate of 2.1. That rate has continued to plunge and currently stands at just 1.5 (Eurostat, 2006). Huntington (1998) noted that, in part as a result of this differential growth rate, in 1900 Muslims made up just 4% of the world's population but by 2025 they are predicted to make up 19%.

¹³Generally, member countries of the European Union have tended to adopt an assimilationist policy toward immigrants (exceptions being the Netherlands, Sweden and England, which support multiculturalism). Italy, for instance, initially pursued an assimilation policy, but in recent years concepts of multiculturalism and cultural diversity have been articulated with some frequency by policymakers, occasionally prompting specific initiatives for the promotion of multiculturalism.

Citizens of some nations express more tolerance than others. Younger, better-educated, and urban citizens are more tolerant on average than older, less educated, rural citizens (European Monitoring Center on Racism and Xenophobia, 2005; Marsh & Sahin-Dikmen, 2002). And (although one must exercise caution in generalizing U.S. research data to European populations) one U.S. study reports that certain individual traits—including racism, social-dominance orientation, right-wing authoritarianism, and religious fundamentalism—predict stronger anti-Muslim sentiments (Rowatt, Franklin, & Cotton, 2005).

Research indicates that by the mid-90s there was much blatant prejudice but even more subtle prejudice by Europeans against Turks, Asians, and North Africans. Furthermore, beginning in the early 1990s, right-wing political movements emerged in response to the perceived threat (Pettigrew, 1998b).

Anti-immigrant sentiments are not equally distributed throughout the EU, nor have they remained stable over time. According to results from the 1997 Eurobarometer attitudes survey, Denmark had the highest level of racial prejudice among the 15 surveyed European nations: 83% of the respondents openly admitted to harboring racist views and 43% admitted to being “very racist” or “quite racist” (European Commission, 1997). Since then, there has been an increase in the proportion of Europeans who wish to place limits on multiculturalism (International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, 2005; Widdop, 2007). By late 2001, the Vienna-based European Monitoring Center on Racism and Xenophobia had documented a significant increase in violent assaults against Muslims (European Monitoring Center on Racism and Xenophobia, 2005). A 2002 survey by the Policy Studies Institute of London found that ethnic or racial discrimination was the most frequently observed form of prejudice throughout Europe (Marsh & Sahin-Dikmen, 2002). Distrust and hostility have become widespread and anger at Muslims is very high (Harrison, Law, & Phillips, 2005). One measure of these sentiments, the European Social Survey, Round 2, determined that a large proportion of residents of many European nations agree with the statement “If a country wants to reduce tension it should stop immigration” (Widdop, 2007).

In its most recent surveys, the Pew Global Attitudes Project has developed a more detailed profile of anti-Muslim feelings. For example, many non-Muslim Europeans tend to hold that Muslims are fanatical, violent, and disrespectful of women. And, after *Jyllands-Posten*, Denmark’s largest newspaper, published cartoons depicting Mohammed in September, 2005, solid majorities of British, French, German, and Spanish people attributed the resulting outrage and violence to Muslim intolerance (Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2006b).

Most (77% of British, 76% of French, 82% of Germans, and 66% of Spaniards) are very or somewhat concerned about the rise of Islamic extremism in their own countries. And, consistent with the impression of self-imposed isolation and the data on religious rather than nationalist identities, most non-Muslim

Europeans (64% of British, 53% of French, 76% of Germans, and 76% of Spaniards) perceive Muslim immigrants as wishing to remain separate from their host societies (Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2006b). This suite of attitudes, opinions, and fears has been referred to as Islamophobia.

Islamophobia in Europe contains multiple elements. Exclusion from full political participation; discrimination in housing, employment, and services; and prejudice in multiple aspects of everyday life have combined to create a lower caste overtly or covertly denied political equality. In addition to these formal manifestations, Islamophobia reveals itself in the simple day-to-day interactions through which people ordinarily express belonging to the same society. There is prejudice—on both sides—against patronizing the same stores, entertainment venues, clubs, and sporting activities. There is, more profoundly, an almost total mutual prejudice against intermarriage. The broad psychological impact of such tensions results in a situation wherein Muslims in Europe largely see themselves as isolated from the mainstream of non-Muslim society and living instead as part of a global *ummah*—a widely-dispersed community with shared identity, interests, and destiny (Coolsaet, 2005; Hunter, 2002; Jordan & Boix, 2004; Nielsen 1999; Roy, 2004).

The failure of Muslims to integrate into European societies, or intergroup tensions as such, may not constitute the sufficient conditions for terrorism, but they may instill the readiness to buy into a terrorism-justifying ideology if one is offered. Such an ideology is offered abundantly these days, on thousands of jihadist Web sites, in radical mosques or madrassas, in the writings of extremist clerics, etc. To the degree that European Muslim communities see themselves as alienated from their host societies, at war with the West, subject to local perceived discrimination, and steeped in feelings of rage stoked by fundamentalist *imams*, young European Muslims—like the members of the 9/11 cell—are potential recruits to terrorism.

European Efforts to Enhance Integration

Multiple initiatives to enhance integration and reduce friction between Muslims and non-Muslims in Europe are currently underway. Some initiatives involve efforts to document discriminatory behavior or civil rights violations, such as the work of the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights (2005), the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (including the Danish Documentation and Advisory Centre on Racial Discrimination), or Sweden’s Health and Discrimination project (Racism and Xenophobia in Sweden, 2004). Other efforts strive to promote dialogue, such as the Council of Europe’s Expert Colloquies and Intercultural Dialogue and Conflict Prevention Project (e.g., Etienne, 2002).

Yet other initiatives involve legislation to punish discriminatory behaviors in employment, housing, or banking. Some efforts are intra-national—for example, a number of programs in Germany to improve relations with the large Turkish minority, or the community introduction programs in Swedish municipali-

ties. More ambitious projects are being evaluated for possible international adoption—for example, the Council of Europe’s “Shared Cities” program (Wilson, 2003) or the proposals currently being formulated by The European Dilemma, an eight-nation research consortium at the Center for Multiethnic Research at Uppsala University that is committed to an examination of discrimination and exclusion in both labor markets and educational systems and is meant to offer antixenophobia strategies on the EU, local, and national levels (Center for Multiethnic Research, 2003).

In short, there are in place considerable social-engineering efforts aimed at ameliorating charged intergroup relations between Muslims and non-Muslims in Europe. Yet, once again, one vital element is surprisingly rare in this mix: an attempt to evaluate what works. As a result, expenditures of money, time, and human resources take place with no persuasive evidence that they will achieve the desired outcomes—enhancement of social integration, acceptance of multiculturalism, pluralism, and the reduction of inter-group tensions. Yet, there exists considerable social-psychological research pertinent to these concerns. We now briefly address this work and its implications.

Prejudice Reduction

Prejudice and discrimination have been among the most intensively studied social-psychological phenomena. Since the publication of Gordon Allport’s classic book, *The Nature of Prejudice* (1954/1979), a massive body of empirical work examining what prejudice is and what can be done about it has been compiled. Obviously, psychological efforts at prejudice reduction alone do not overcome gross disparities in income and legal inequalities, or remove intergroup competition for scarce resources. In fact, prejudice is strongly related to measures of objective disparities and conflicts and is augmented by a sense of injustice, humiliation, and competition. For that reason, psychological efforts at attitude change and prejudice reduction may work best if combined with credible policies aimed at the elimination of objective inequalities.

It is also true, however, that prejudice contains strong elements of *misperception*: It tends (a) to generalize to individual group members the traits and attitudes that are perceived to characterize the group as an aggregate (Fiske, 1998; Macrae, Stangor, & Hewstone, 1996; Schneider, 2004), and (b) to generalize from some perceived negative traits to other, evaluatively consistent negative traits, producing a “halo effect” for which there may be little if any objective evidence (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977).

The promise of prejudice-reduction efforts is that they may eliminate those misperceptions and, under proper conditions, may help build a common identity. The less that people regard others as competing, threatening, alien out-group members and the more they come to see others as supportive in-group members with shared goals, the lower the impetus for discriminatory behavior and the higher the impetus for social cooperation

(Dovidio & Gaertner, 1986; Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000). Fifty years of research suggests that prejudice reduction is an essential step toward successful integration. And in the long run, integration may prove to be an effective strategy of counterterrorism. Just as the 50-year desegregation battle in the United States was primed by early prejudice-reduction experiments, successful integration in the EU could be primed by forward-thinking social science devoted to understanding the most effective ways to increase intercultural harmony.

Origin and Evolution of the Contact Hypothesis

Until the end of WWII, the United States largely ignored the problem of racial prejudice. African Americans were technically freed and even enfranchised to vote, yet they were subjected to systematic prejudice, discrimination, and outright oppression. By the early 1950s, pioneering social scientists were finally turning their attention to the pernicious problem of prejudice. Gordon Allport’s seminal 1954 text created a watershed moment in the history of social psychology. In his book, Allport laid out the emotional, developmental, cognitive, and cultural roots of prejudice. He also described the fitful first efforts to resolve the problem or at least reduce its magnitude. Hinting at the direction that efforts to reduce prejudice may take, Allport cited a commentary by Lee and Humphrey regarding the Bloody Monday race riots in Detroit in 1943: “People who had become neighbors did not riot against each other. The students of Wayne University—white and black—went to their classes in peace throughout Bloody Monday. And there were no disorders between white and black workers in the war plants” (Allport, 1954/1979, p. 261).

Allport’s main point was that contact between rival groups may initially lead to anxiety and competition but that this often gives way to accommodation and eventually to integration. Based on his review of different programs for prejudice reduction, Allport arrived at what later became known as the contact hypothesis:

Prejudice (unless deeply rooted in the character structure of the individual) may be reduced by equal status contact between majority and minority groups in the pursuit of common goals. The effect is greatly enhanced if this contact is sanctioned by institutional supports (i.e., by law, custom or local atmosphere), and provided it is of a sort that leads to the perception of common interests and common humanity between members of the two groups. (Allport, 1954/1979, p. 281)

According to Allport, optimal intergroup contact contains a number of essential elements:

- *Equal status* of members of the separate groups that are brought into contact with each other
- *Pursuit of common goals*—that is, adoption of superordinate objectives that members of the separate groups may share
- *Institutional sanction* by respected societal authorities

- *Positive outcome*—that is, a realization by members of the separate groups that contact produced desirable results

By the mid-1990s, it became apparent that prejudice reduction required a second look. Allport had explained how to reduce prejudice, but not why contact should work. Some scholars (e.g., Brewer, Manzi, & Shaw, 1993) attributed successful prejudice reduction to personal contact between individuals leading to *personalization*, or the breakdown of arbitrary judgments based on social categories. Critics asked how the development of personal friendships through contact would generalize to all members of a stereotyped category (Hewstone, 1996). Some scholars suggested that positive intergroup contact worked so long as participants maintained identity with their own in-group (Hewstone and Brown, 1986). Others advised that maintenance of in-group identity was exactly wrong; the success of prejudice-reduction interventions depended on the development of a shared group identity (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1986; Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000).

Pettigrew (1998a) offered an important reformulation of the contact hypothesis, in which contact is described as a process of change taking place over time. This process is assumed to consist of three stages. In Pettigrew's model, initial contact provokes anxiety, but positive personal contact with someone from the other group serves to reduce anxiety and allows liking to take place—albeit liking for that one person, not for her or his group as a whole. Over time, the liking can be extended to other members of the out-group, perhaps in accordance with Heider's (1958) balance-theoretic logic whereby the friends of a friend are one's friends as well. This may occur even though the in-group member is still very much aware of her or his own group membership and identity—consistent with Hewstone and Brown's (1986) theory. Finally, when the established contact is optimal, a shift in identity may take place as superordinate goals supercede the old in-group/out-group differentiation, and—as predicted by Gaertner and Dovidio (2000)—a common ingroup identity may emerge and optimal prejudice reduction may occur. According to Pettigrew (1998a), many groups fail to achieve the final step. The crucial question is, what is the best way to optimize the chances of success?

Fifty years after Allport, a wealth of experimental literature testing ways to reduce intergroup prejudice has appeared (Lemmer & Wagner, 2006; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). Multiple methods, varying the duration, frequency, and type of intergroup contact, have been examined. Some methods have involved school-based experiences, others community- or employment-based encounter groups, yet others recreational groups or groups of fellow travelers. This body of work has led to several conclusions.

Perhaps the most significant conclusion is that contact seems to work. In a meta-analytic review of 515 studies involving 713 population samples and 1,383 tests, there was a significant negative correlation between contact and prejudice. While the

mean correlation of $r = -.21$ might be considered modest, the correlation was actually higher among the most rigorously conducted projects and was most robust when measured by direct observation of intergroup contact as opposed to self-report measures. Numerous observations conducted in laboratories, schools, residential settings, recreational activities, or travel contexts yielded evidence of benefits.

Second, some types of interventions appear to work better than others. Generally speaking, incidental contact or travel excursions seem to yield little positive effect (mean $r = -.113$). Residential interaction appears to fare somewhat better ($r = -.202$). Educational and work-based settings seem better yet ($r = -.213$ and $-.224$). The best effects were seen in studies carried out in recreational contexts ($r = -.299$).

Third, there was some support for Allport's suggestions for optimal contact conditions of equality, authority sanction, and cooperation. However, it appears that Allport's conditions do not assure beneficial effects, nor are they absolutely required for beneficial outcomes. The single most important factor appears to be institutional support: When authorities sanction the contact, it predicts success better than any other factor (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). It may also be essential that the groups achieve success in their cooperative endeavors (the positive-outcome condition in Allport's list), for failure enhances bias and scapegoating (Worchel, Andreoli, & Folger, 1977).

Fourth, there was strong support for the so-called "extended contact" effect. That is, reduction of prejudice was typically generalized not only to nonparticipant members of the out-group (for example, to all Blacks when participants were White) but to other out-groups as well (for example, to the disabled or the intellectually impaired). Overall, the authors concluded, "There is little need to demonstrate further contact's general ability to lessen prejudice" (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006, p. 768).

It must be acknowledged that prejudicial attitudes are by no means the only explanation for aggression toward the out-group that may translate to terrorism. Some scholars have claimed that the relationship between prejudice, discrimination, and overt aggression is weak and theorized that other factors may be more important than prejudice in determining discriminatory acts and actual physical aggression (e.g., Dovidio, Brigham, Johnson, & Gaertner, 1996; Struch & Schwartz, 1989). In regard to the 2006 U.K. mass airline-bombing plot, for example, Elliot (2006) writes,

Nor can it be easily argued that social deprivation or ethnic discrimination breeds radicalism; many of those arrested were from middle class homes—the sort that send their children to university—in standard British multicultural neighborhoods, where Muslims, white Britons and more recent immigrants from Eastern Europe live together. (p. 29)

Indeed, prejudicial attitudes need not derive from personal experience of deprivation or discrimination but may be stoked

by inflammatory rhetoric in mosques or Web sites or shaped by events far afield—such as the war in Iraq—as they are represented in the media. In the same vein, individual poverty was not a factor motivating al-Qaeda’s 9/11 bombers (Krueger & Maleckova, 2003; National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States, 2004). Still, the *facts* of poverty, of income discrepancy, or discrimination in the work-place may translate into widespread perceptions and prejudicial attitudes fueling the readiness to embrace extremist rhetoric and to support political violence. Overcoming such prejudice would probably require a coordinated set of measures, including media campaigns, enforcement of strict anti-discriminatory norms and policies, etc., as well as the creation of opportunities for optimal contact between members of the Muslim and non-Muslim communities.

Concluding Comments: Psychological Implications of the Prejudice-Reduction Frame

The unique aspect of the prejudice-reduction frame is its explicitly bilateral character. Admittedly, the war, law enforcement, and epidemiological metaphors did hint that some counterterrorist tactics employed by the targets of terrorism (e.g., those likely to produce the killing of innocents, destruction of property, and spawning of a refugee problem) may augment rather than reduce terrorism; yet their primary focus has been on the psyche of the terrorists and their supporters. By contrast, the prejudice-reduction approach recognizes that terrorism involves a recursive interplay of two types of mentality, that of the terrorists and that of their targets. For instance, the perceived otherness of Muslim immigrants for European hosts, and vice versa, as well as the aversion that otherness often evokes, may feed mutually negative stereotypes that motivate actions that may, in turn, augment and polarize the stereotypes (via an expectancy-confirmation mechanism)—and hence exacerbate intergroup tensions.

A major social-psychological intervention to reduce prejudice is the creation of positive contact between members of the conflicted groups (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). Research suggests that the creation of optimal contact, particularly if carried at an early enough age, may contribute to the development of positive attitudes toward members of the out-group. However, positive contact in unique and isolated settings (e.g., a certain school or recreational facility) may be counteracted by events, initiatives, and rhetorics external to that context, such as depictions in the media and discussions in one’s community. To the extent that such depictions portray aggressive, humiliating, or discriminatory activities perpetrated by one group against the other, they might well damage the positive will engendered in the restricted, positive-contact settings. Thus, efforts at prejudice reduction via positive contact need to be pursued in the context of a larger set of policies—for example those concerning immigration laws, educational programs, and foreign policy initiatives designed to

augment the good-will-generating efforts of optimal-contact programs.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

The four ways of thinking about counterterrorism considered in the preceding pages roughly define a continuum. The continuum ranges from a totalistic and indiscriminating war metaphor (inherent in the “global war on terrorism” concept) that condemns the enemy group as “evil” and pulls out all stops in order to defeat it; through a more nuanced law enforcement metaphor that seeks to precisely target the actual perpetrators of terrorism and separate them from their potential base of community support; through the epidemiological metaphor that addresses the sources of such support as they derive from the ideological belief system that justifies terrorism and the mechanisms of persuasion and indoctrination that spread the ideology in the pool of potential supporters; and finally to the prejudice-reduction framing that highlights the dynamic interplay of perceptions that conflicted groups may have of each other and the spiral of alienation and increasing psychological distance (Lieberman, Trope, & Stephan, 2007) that need to be broken on both sides of the divide.

The War Metaphor

Each of the perspectives discussed in this monograph addresses a specific psychological piece of the “counterterrorism puzzle” (Ganor, 2005); each has vulnerabilities as well as points of strength. The flaws of the war metaphor include the massive overcommitment to counterterrorism at the expense of major alternative concerns including the humanitarian value of protecting lives and ensuring the enlightened treatment of prisoners. Much has been written about the outrage in affected communities evoked by killing of innocents, destruction of property, and dislocation of families. All these may create a “boomerang effect” based on a defiance motivation (LaFree & Dugan, 2007), potentially boosting the stock of recruits to terrorism (Kaplan et al., 2005).

An additional drawback of the war metaphor, related to overcommitment of resources that the war concept implies, is the arousal of unreasonable expectations as to the counterterrorism effort’s required duration. In case of asymmetrical struggle against insurgents or terrorists, such expectations often involve serious underestimates, breeding general disappointment with the results and a public outcry to discontinue the effort and bring the troops home. Finally, the war metaphor may evoke conflicting and inconsistent expectations derived from the divergent war analogies one may envision (e.g., the Second World War, the Cold War, or the Vietnam War). These may forestall the formulation of a coherent counterterrorism policy and give rise to unhelpful debates based on questionable historical similes.

Undermining Terrorists' Capability

These drawbacks notwithstanding, the war metaphor isn't totally devoid of utility. As Ganor (2005) noted, "the military component should not be discounted as a legitimate and effective means for eliminating terrorist attacks, reducing their damage, and hurting terrorist organizations" (p. 40). Primarily, military measures, if properly executed, may hamper terrorists' ability to carry out attacks. In a recent paper, LaFree & Dugan (2007) used a continuous-time survival analysis based on Cox's (1972) proportional-hazard models (see Dugan, LaFree, & Piquero, 2005) to analyze the impact of military measures carried out by the British in Northern Ireland. LaFree & Dugan (2007) These authors have shown that a massive military intervention by the British, referred to as the Motorman Operation in 1972 (that involved the participation of 30,000 troops, the use of heavy armor, etc.), appeared to reduce over the long term the incidence of subsequent terrorist attacks, whereas more restricted military interventions (namely, the Falls Curfew, the Loughall and the Gibraltar incidents) appeared to significantly increase it. Similarly, Chen, Fishman, & Kruglanski (2007), using proportional-hazard models, found that a massive occupation by the Israeli military of West Bank towns in 2002, referred to as Operation Defensive Shield, and the construction of the defensive fence by Israel decreased the incidence of suicide bombing by Hamas militants, whereas a more restricted 2004 operation in Gaza lasting 2 weeks, called Operation Days of Penitence, actually increased their incidence.

Eppright (1997) concluded that Israel's massive 1996 incursion into Lebanon significantly reduced the amount of Hezbollah's rocket attacks on Israel, and Greener-Barcham (2002) reported that the liberation of hostages in the Entebbe airport by Israeli commandos in 1976 markedly reduced the number of airline hijackings against Israeli targets and the seizure of hostages. At least in the short term, then, successful military operations might reduce terrorist organizations' operational capability, and in that sense reduce the threat that their intentions may pose. However, it is often suggested that, in the long run, terrorism—at least if it enjoys a broad base of popular support—has no ready military solution (Ganor, 2005, p. 39).

Motivational Effects

Mention was already made of the potential of military operations to evoke outrage and elevate terrorists' defiance motivation (LaFree & Dugan, 2007). Indeed according to Ganor (2005), one of the dilemmas of counterterrorism is the fact that "the more successful one is in carrying out actions that damage the terrorists organizations' ability to perpetrate attacks, the more . . . their motivation will only increase" (p. 41). From this perspective, former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon remarked that counterterrorism military activities undertaken by Israel were "successes for periods of time [gaining] breathing space for certain periods of time" (Ganor, 2005, p. 292).

These insights notwithstanding, it also seems possible that sustained military pressure would ultimately gnaw at terrorists' motivations and deflate their morale. Palestinians have repeatedly complained about the Israeli policy of targeted killings and demanded that it be stopped. It also appears that this particular policy instilled a measure of fear in militants' leaders, forcing them to go "partially underground, turning off their cell phones, avoiding official vehicles and restricting their movements" (El Deeb, 2007).

Furthermore, sustained military pressure might induce in members of a terrorist group the motivation to disengage from terrorism under some conditions. Ironically, such motivation may arise from the increased "group-centrism" (Kruglanski, Pierro, Mannetti, & DeGrada, 2006) that external pressures may create. Horgan (2005) cites in this connection the reflections of Michael Bauman, who disengaged from the German June 2nd movement of which he was member. In Bauman's words, "The group becomes increasingly closed. The greater the pressure from the outside, the more you stick together, the more mistakes you make, the more pressure is turned inward. . . . [T]hose are . . . the things that come together horribly at the end" (as cited in Horgan, 2005, p. 14).

The extensive "group centrism" that external (e.g., military) pressures encourage may come at the expense of one's individualistic objectives. To the extent that the latter are important to the individual, this may induce a growing desire to disengage from the terrorist organization. The relevant motivational considerations are apparent in Adriana Faranda's reflections on her dissociation from the Red Brigades (as cited in Horgan, 2005):

Choosing to enter the Red Brigades—to become clandestine and . . . to break off relations with your family, is a choice so total that it involves your entire life . . . It means choosing to occupy yourself from morning till night with problems of politics, or organization, and fighting; and no longer with normal life—culture, cinema, babies, the education of your children, with all the things that fill other people's lives . . . [W]hen you remove yourself from society . . . you become sad because a whole area of life is missing, because you are aware that life is more than politics and political work. (p. 148)

The individualistically motivated wish to disengage from the group might usher in a rationalization in form of a disenchantment with the group's ideology or with the degree to which the group is living up to its ideological commitments. In Faranda's words, the process of ideological disenchantment encompassed "everything . . . It [involved] the revolution itself; Marxism, violence, the logic of enmity, of conflict, of one's relationship with authority, a way of working out problems, of confronting reality and of facing the future" (cited in Horgan, 2005, p. 148).

In summary, relentless military pressure on a terrorist organization may generate a complex field of opposing psychological forces acting upon its members, including the motivation to strengthen one's commitment to the cause, fomenting one's

resolve and defiance in face of the enemy, as well as yearnings to liberate oneself from excessive group centrism and to regain the freedom to pursue one's individualistic objectives. Which of these forces may prevail may partially depend on the degree to which the group enjoys a wide degree of support in the larger society in which it is embedded. Members of groups whose world views and shared realities are discrepant from the society at large (as may be the case with urban terrorist organizations such as the Bader Meinhoff group or the Italian Red Brigades) may be aware of general societal values and objectives, even if they suppress them for a time. Under external pressure, the members' dependence on the group may turn into an insufferable psychological burden fostering the motivation to disengage from the group, and allowing the suppressed societal values (e.g. concerns with individual freedom and happiness) to rebound.

Unlike members of those latter groups for whom a reintegration in the larger society and the embrace of its values constitutes a potentially viable alternative,¹⁴ for members of groups whose ideological objectives coincide with values of their community (e.g., Hamas or Hezbollah) such an alternative is less available. For the latter individuals, disengagement from the terrorist organization implies to some extent betrayal of one's society, leaving them with little psychological choice. Unless the ideological climate in the society shifts, members of such groups might, therefore, respond with defiance rather than acquiescence to military pressures exerted on their organization.

The Law Enforcement Metaphor

Like the war metaphor, the law enforcement metaphor has some advantages but also potential disadvantages. One of its main advantages is its targeting precision in focusing on actual perpetrators/conspirators who are in violation of the legal code. Such an approach avoids the sense of injustice and attendant outrage that indiscriminate war-related destruction may invite. Relatedly, the targeting precision of law enforcement may allow a separation of the apex of the terrorism pyramid (i.e., actual perpetrators) from its support base (i.e., individuals whose attitudes may be aligned with those of the terrorists but whose actions are in conformity with the law). Such separation may constitute a precondition for driving a wedge between terrorists and their broader community; an obvious advantage of this is the potential for obtaining invaluable human intelligence needed to thwart impending terrorist schemes.

The law enforcement metaphor also has possible disadvantages. Police forces are limited, for example, in their ability to launch the massive strikes that may be occasionally required to

cripple terrorists' capability (even if temporarily) and reduce the damage that such capability might afford. Additionally, massive commitment of force communicates resolve and determination, an asset in the battle of wills that counterterrorism typically involves.

A further limitation of the strict law enforcement metaphor is that it neglects the ideological basis of terrorists' struggle. It is that feature of terrorism, after all, that distinguishes it from ordinary crime. In this sense, the rational cost-benefit analysis that decision to collaborate with the police versus the gangs, say, may involve (Akerlof & Yellen, 1994) doesn't fully apply to terrorism.¹⁵ Especially in those cases where a strong ideological bond exists between large segments of the broader society and the militant organization (a bond that may exist between the Palestinian population and Hamas, the Southern Lebanese population and Hezbollah, or the Tamil population and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eilam [LTTE]), it may be rather difficult to drive a wedge between the community and the militants without addressing the ideological underpinnings of their collaboration. The latter enterprise may necessitate a "struggle of ideas" in attempts to persuade the broader community that terrorism is (a) ineffectual and/or (b) immoral, (c) that there exist alternative superior means (e.g., negotiations, diplomacy) to achieve the goals currently pursued via terrorism,¹⁶ or (d) that those goals (e.g., the dream of a global *ummah*) are unattainable and in need of adjustment (for discussion, see Kruglanski & Fishman, 2006).

The Epidemiological Metaphor

An advantage of the epidemiological metaphor (Stares & Yacoubian, 2006) is the linkage of the terrorism problem to the ideological bases of terrorist commitments (the "virus"), their modes of transmission (the "vector"), and the vulnerability factors present in certain segments of society (the "susceptible populations") that fuel people's readiness to buy into terrorism-warranting ideologies. In this sense, the epidemiological metaphor explicitly recognizes the wide-ranging efforts needed to combat certain (strongly ideologically entrenched) types of terrorist activity as well as the likely protracted nature of the process that might be needed to eradicate it.

¹⁵In this connection, Krueger & Maleckova (2002, pp. 31–32) remark that "The standard economic model of crime suggests that those with the lowest value of time should engage in criminal activity. But . . . in most cases terrorism is less like property crime and more like a violent form of political engagement. . ."

¹⁶In recent years, several terrorism-using organizations seem to have reverted to political means, in recognition that the armed struggle has failed to advance their strategic means. The cases in point are the Irish Republican Army (IRA) following the Good Friday agreement on April 10, 1998; the ETA organization (Basque Fatherland and Liberty) in Spain, which declared a permanent ceasefire in 2006; and similar ceasefire announcements by the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK) in Turkey, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC), the Front Islamic du Salut (FIS) in Algeria, the al-Jihad and Gam'at al Islamiyya in Egypt, and the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eilam) in Sri Lanka (see also Karmon, 2002).

¹⁴For instance, in 1979 and 1982 the Italian government enacted repentance laws meant to facilitate an exit from terrorism and a reintegration into society. The laws "promised substantial leniency if terrorists collaborate with the police and judicial authorities and a lesser degree of leniency if they only separate themselves from the terrorist group" (Ferracuti, 1998, p. 62). These legal initiatives are generally credited with dismantling of the Red Brigades movement in the 1980s.

Despite its several advantages, the epidemiological metaphor has limitations as well. Whereas the war and law enforcement metaphors that focus on the immediate threat neglect the long-range process of ideological conversion and radicalization, the epidemiological metaphor, focused on the wider picture, neglects the “here and now” of counterterrorism and the value of resolute strikes and intelligence gathering activities needed to counter terrorists’ concrete schemes and capabilities.

The epidemiological metaphor may also be faulted for its unilateral emphasis on the perpetrators of terrorism and its neglect of the targeted side’s policies and their possible part in offending the Muslim population and fueling its resonance to the terrorist rhetoric.¹⁷ As part of the issue, the negative language of the metaphor that likens the Islamist ideology to a malignant “virus” (as well as the disease metaphor as a whole) might be offensive to adherents of the Islamist ideology, hence inducing resistance to campaigns designed to change their hearts and minds.

The Prejudice-Reduction Frame

The danger of offending groups that use terrorism is avoided by the prejudice-reduction frame, which explicitly locates the terrorism problem at the interface of two communities troubled by deteriorating relations. One advantage of this approach is its appreciation of the dynamic character of intergroup relations and of the potential for a spiraling enmity that leads intergroup communication to break down (Deutsch, 1973), for mutual blame placing, and for the entrenchment of positions behind pernicious stereotypes.

Another advantage of the prejudice-reduction approach is provision of a specific intervention technique that is grounded in the notion of optimal intergroup contact. If applied broadly, such a prejudice-reduction technique might make an appreciable contribution to the lessening of tensions between groups and the opening of minds to more constructive reciprocal approaches (Kruglanski, 2004; Kruglanski, Dechesne, & Erb, 2006). In particular, the possibility of applying the technique to children in school settings at a relatively early age might afford an opportunity to psychologically “immunize” individuals’ attitudes (McGuire, 1961) against subsequent conflict-promoting communications.

In fact, some “optimal contact” programs are already under way—for instance, the School Linking Project in Bradford, West

Yorkshire, where teenaged students from different backgrounds are brought together for multiple contact experiences in which they work cooperatively on learning projects. This project, which has been underway since 2000 and other similar ones merit careful psychological assessment as to how effective they are at promoting positive intergroup attitudes, how persistent they are, and how resistant they are to radical rhetoric. Substantial evidence that carefully designed prejudice-reduction interventions yield measurable short-term improvement in intergroup relations exists. However, a major gap appears in the literature of applied social psychology: It has yet to be demonstrated that such interventions produce long-term enhancement in intergroup relations and reduction in intergroup violence. Given the current worldwide tensions between Muslims and non-Muslims, rigorous research in this area is urgently needed.

For all its benefits, the prejudice-reduction framework, like the previously considered metaphors, captures a particular aspect of the terrorism problem, however important, and inevitably neglects other aspects: First, it is vulnerable to being overridden by other powerful influences, including policies of states (e.g., Britain’s involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. support for Israel) that may be readily interpreted as anti-Muslim. Thus, even if a positive-contact program manages to instill positive attitudes toward specific members of an out-group, large-scale events on the social and political levels might undermine their generalization to the out-group as a whole.

Second, in context of the positive-contact notion, the prejudice-reduction framework is free of ideological contents. It is mediated by cooperative activities on neutral tasks, such as the jigsaw classroom (Aronson & Bridgman, 1979), and it fails to address the ideological element (radical Islamism and jihadism) that appears essential to the process of radicalization.

Finally, like the epidemiological metaphor, the prejudice-reduction concept cannot address the “here and now” of terrorism and the need to counter specific terrorist schemes and protect societies from the immediate threats that these entail. Thus, the prejudice framework offers a potential long-term solution to one important driver of the psychology of grievance, but it neglects the short-term challenges posed by terrorism; it does not resolve substantive political issues and grievances, does not disable terrorists’ methods for addressing such issues, and may only influence the communication channels for disseminating ideological arguments and a radicalized belief system after considerable delay.

Concluding Comments: Paradoxes of Counterterrorism

The counterterrorism metaphors examined in this paper beam a search light (to use a metaphor!) onto diverse aspects of the problem, each illuminating some of its aspects while leaving others in darkness. Jointly, however, they manage to convey the considerable complexity that systematic counterterrorism efforts must encounter.

¹⁷In a recent public opinion survey conducted in Morocco, Egypt, Pakistan, and Indonesia by the National Center for the Study of Terrorism and the Response to Terrorism (START) at the University of Maryland, only minorities of the populations surveyed endorsed support for the killing of civilians. Given the overall sizes of the populations involved, however, these minorities translate into millions of terrorism supporters. Thus, in Morocco the 8% minority of terrorism supporters translates into the figure of 2,600,000 people, in Egypt the 15% minority translates into 12,000,000 people, in Pakistan the 5% minority translates into 8,000,000 people, and in Indonesia the 4% minority translates into 20,000,000 people. (National Center for the Study of Terrorism and the Response to Terrorism, 2007).

In part, the complexity stems from the fact that counterterrorist activities that may appear desirable from the standpoint of a given framing of the problem may contradict goals implicit in another metaphor. For instance, the use of military force suggested by the war metaphor might convey one's resolve and determination, cripple a terrorist organization's ability to function, and apply psychological pressure on its members. Yet at the same time it might fuel the outrage of the population affected by the military activity and undermine the objective of reducing their support for terrorists, which are desirable goals from the perspective of the law enforcement metaphor. The same may be said of tough interrogation tactics, ethnic profiling, and discriminatory immigration policies that are compatible with the war metaphor but rather incompatible with the law enforcement metaphor or the long-term goal of reducing prejudice. Negotiating with terrorists may communicate that there are alternative means to their goals outside of terrorism—consistent with the goal of countering the virulent terrorism-encouraging ideology, as suggested by the epidemiological metaphor. Yet negotiating with terrorists also conveys that terrorism is an efficient tactic for the attainment of strategic objectives, thereby encouraging its future use. This is consistent with the terrorist-promoting ideology and inconsistent with implications of the epidemiological approach to counterterrorism. Attempting to treat all varieties of terrorism as crime, suggested by the law enforcement metaphor, may encourage international cooperation in the fight against terrorism but may also contribute to a collaboration between terrorist organizations and forego possible alliances with militant organizations whose activities are consistent with one's own strategic interests—an approach suggested by the war metaphor.¹⁸

As is typically the case with metaphors (Lakoff, 1990), each counterterrorism framing described earlier affords a restricted understanding of the phenomenon. Hence, its unlimited adoption may impose blinders on decision makers' vision, leading to potential pitfalls and producing unintended consequences. From this perspective, a comprehensive approach is called for, based on appreciation of the complex trade-offs that each move in the counterterrorism enterprise may entail. At present, such an integrated counterterrorism policy seems to be lacking in most nations' dealings with terrorism.¹⁹ Ideally, military, law enforcement, and area experts should collaborate and

utilize data from social scientists in pertinent disciplines that may contribute to the tactical and strategic decision-making process by highlighting the likely psychological, political, or sociological impact of various counterterrorism initiatives.

Admittedly, setting up of such a collaboration may not be easy. The difficulties of coordination and information sharing between the different intelligence-gathering and law enforcement agencies in the United States received ample commentary and led, in 2005, to establishment of the office of Director of National Intelligence, the effectiveness of which has yet to be determined. No less problematic is utilization by government of academic knowledge. Ariel Merari, an Israeli terrorism expert, noted in 1991 that "For a variety of reasons including resistance to external influences in general and suspicion of academia in particular, government officials have failed to utilize even sound knowledge and competent professional advice of academics" (Merari, 1991, p. 88).

Sixteen years later, in 2007, the situation is somewhat different. There seems at least the will (if not exactly the way) on part of government to draw on pertinent academic knowledge in regards to terrorism. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 wrote into law the establishment of the University Programs under the Division of Science and Technology at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). This initiative has led to the establishment of several centers of excellence (COEs) at different U.S. universities, addressing different aspects of terrorism—including its social and behavioral aspects, investigated at The Center for the Study of Terrorism and the Response to Terrorism (START). Thus, an important formal step toward establishing a communication channel between academic research in the behavioral and social sciences and a government agency entrusted with national security has been made. The common task of the COEs and the DHS is to develop ways in which each is continually kept abreast of the other's concerns, questions, and pertinent findings. To be sure, the incorporation of long-term considerations may seem at odds with, or tangential to, current security needs as seen by the government.²⁰ Indeed, the appreciation of their essential relevance to policy may require a climate change and cultivation of new cadres of security experts whose outlook would be formed through an educational process in which social and psychological aspects of terrorism and counterterrorism constitute an inseparable part and parcel. Training such cadres is a major task confronting the security community these days.

¹⁸For instance, Israel started supporting Hamas in the late 1970s, seeing that organization as an ally against the PLO. Similarly, During most of the 1980s, the CIA secretly sent billions of dollars of military aid to Afghanistan to support the Mujahedeen—or "holy warriors"—against the Soviet Union, which had invaded in 1979. And writing in July 10, 2007, in the *New York Sun*, Daniel Pipes recommends "unleashing" against the Iranian regime the Iranian opposition group known as the Mujahedeen-e Khalq or MEK, despite it being accused of constituting a Marxist-Islamist terrorist cult (Pipes, 2007, p.7).

¹⁹Ganor (2005), for instance, states that "Most Israeli policymakers who were interviewed . . . were in complete agreement that Israel does not have—nor did it ever have a written, structured and unambiguous counterterrorism policy" (p. 288).

²⁰In commenting on the Israeli approach to counterterrorism, Ganor (2005) writes that "The most prominent disappointment of Israel's counterterrorism activities has been the failure to understand the phenomenon as morale-psychological warfare . . . [hence] almost no morale-psychological considerations are taken into account in choosing the counter-terrorism actions that Israel undertakes" (p. 292).

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